Ethical Advance and Ethical Risk - A Mengzian Reflection
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Ethical Advance and Ethical Risk - A Mengzian Reflection L. K. Gustin Law 1 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract On one view of ethical development, someone not yet virtuous can reliably progress by engaging in what meaningfully resembles virtuous conduct. However, if the wellintended conduct is psychologically demanding, one's character, precisely because one is not yet virtuous, may worsen rather than improve. This risk of degradation casts doubt on the developmental view. I counter the doubt through one interpretation and one application of the Mengzi 孟子. In passage 2A2, invoking the image of a farmer who “helped” the crop grow by pulling the sprouts, MENG Ke 孟軻 cautions, “do not help it grow.” I defend a novel interpretation: do not advance with a naïve negligence about your psychophysiological constitution. I also show how to advance with realistic care by pointing out an overlooked application of a much-discussed cultivation technique illustrated in Mengzi 1A7: ethical reflection can conciliate one with one’s ongoing or past advanced action, lowering the action’s risk of degradation. Keywords David Nivison . Early Ruism (Confucianism) . Moral psychology and
development . Nourishment ofvital energy (yang qi 養氣) . Self-cultivation and corruption . Virtue ethics
1 Introduction Consider an individual who cares to be right in their1 conduct but is not yet perfect in character. As such, they can understandably be conflicted or hesitant in the following situation. They see what in an ideal sense the best thing to do is: virtuous individuals, as For an indefinite individual in third person singular, I use “they” instead of “he” or “she,” and “themself” as the reflexive instead of “himself” or “herself.” These uses date back to the early 16th century and late 15th century, respectively. See Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Themselves, n.5” and “They, n.2.”
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* L. K. Gustin Law [email protected]
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Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
L. K. Gustin Law
this subject envisions them, would all do A on the same ground, that p. This subject can even be sufficiently moved by the consideration that p and have the resolve to do A if it is clear to them that this is the right thing for them to do. However, as it turns out, whether this is so is rightly unclear to them, for they have certain ethical imperfections, because of which their doing A would risk things somehow turning out badly. This special risk is what gives our circumspect agent pause. A well-referenced example of such a risk (Doris 1998: 518) is a squash player with a bad temper or some similar imperfection: maybe they should not approach the other player for the sporting handshake after suffering a humiliating defeat, if they anticipate smashing the victor in the face with their racquet. Risks like this can give pause to someone who is not fully virtuous but sufficiently apprehensive. Imperfection-based risk can be invoked to object to the claim that an action is right if and only
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