Europeanization, Party Government or Legacies? Explaining Executive Governance in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hunga
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Europeanization, Party Government or Legacies? Explaining Executive Governance in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary Martin Brusis Centre for Applied Policy Research, Munich University, Maria-Theresia-Str. 21, D-81379 Mu¨nchen, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]
The article discusses whether and how the impact of the European Union, the polarity of party politics or the cultural legacies of communist political rule explain patterns of governance in Bulgarian, Czech and Hungarian executives. Focusing on the formal-legal institutionalization of decision making, the relationship of administrative and political coordination and the centralization of power within executives, it is argued that the varying patterns of centralization and coordination can best be explained by the polarity of party competition. Polarized political competition in Hungary has generated prime ministerial government backed by elaborate devices of administrative coordination. A multipolar constellation of parties in the Czech Republic is associated with the prevalence of political coordination and collegiality at the cabinet level. Bulgaria constitutes an intermediate case with respect to the polarity of its party politics, the weights of political vs administrative coordination and the centralization of governance. The EU has provided incentives for the codification of decision-making practices and for horizontal co-ordination, but the observable patterns of executive governance show a considerable and persisting diversity. This diversity reflects the underlying, distinctive configurations of government, state administration and society in Central and East European countries. Comparative European Politics (2004) 2, 163–184. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110034 Keywords: Europeanization; core executive; party government; Central and Eastern Europe
Introduction Governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been key actors in consolidating democracy and the rule of law, implementing the transition to a market economy and preparing for membership in the European Union (EU).1 However, there is still little systematic and comparative knowledge on the internal dynamics of executives.2 The broader literature on postsocialist transition and EU accession countries offers three main accounts to explain institutional arrangements and development trajectories in the region. First, ‘Europeanization’ studies focusing on the domestic impact of EU enlargement have documented how the EU-induced governments to adapt their structures
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and policies to the requirements of membership (Grabbe, 2001; Linden, 2002; Laffan, 2004). Second, studies inspired by approaches of comparative politics have identified domestic political actors as mainly responsible for the outcomes of policy reforms, emphasizing that political parties and elites not only determine policies according to their preferences, but also the institutional rules of the game (Elster et al., 1998; Orenstein, 2001). Third, re
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