Existential inertia and the Aristotelian proof
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Existential inertia and the Aristotelian proof Joseph C. Schmid1 Received: 7 January 2020 / Accepted: 26 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Edward Feser defends the ‘Aristotelian proof’ for the existence of God, which reasons that the only adequate explanation of the existence of change is in terms of an unchangeable, purely actual being. His argument, however, relies on the falsity of the Existential Inertia Thesis (EIT), according to which concrete objects tend to persist in existence without requiring an existential sustaining cause. In this article, I first characterize the dialectical context of Feser’s Aristotelian proof, paying special attention to EIT and its rival thesis—the Existential Expiration Thesis. Next, I provide a more precise characterization of EIT, after which I outline two metaphysical accounts of existential inertia. I then develop new lines of reasoning in favor of EIT that appeal to the theoretical virtues of explanatory power and simplicity. Finally, I address the predominant criticisms of EIT in the literature. Keywords Existential inertia · God · Aristotelian proof · Sustaining causation
Introduction Edward Feser (2017) argues for the God of classical theism as follows. Nothing can be reduced from potency to act except by some causal actualizer in a state of actuality. But any substance that is a composite of act and potency is, at any moment at which it exists, reducing from potentially existent to actually existent and hence requires a concurrent sustaining actualizer of its existence. This hierarchical or per se chain of sustaining actualizers cannot be infinite, in which case it must terminate in a purely actual, unactualized actualizer (i.e. God). Premise seven of Feser’s argument is that the “existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualization of S’s potential for existence,” where S is some substance that is an admixture of potency and act (Feser 2017, p. 35). This premise amounts to a rejection of the Existential Inertia Thesis, according to which
* Joseph C. Schmid [email protected] 1
Purdue University, 610 Purdue Mall, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
concrete objects tend to persist in existence (once in existence) without requiring a sustaining cause.1 Despite its relevance to some of the most rigorous arguments for God’s existence,2 there has been surprisingly little discussion of existential inertia in metaphysics and philosophy of religion.3 This paper is meant to fill this lacuna and inspire greater discussion of the issue. Before characterizing existential inertia in greater detail, it is worth considering the dialectical context in which it arises. The first thing to emphasize is that there are at least two competing theses in debates concerning persistence and divine causal sustenance: Preliminary Existential Inertia Thesis (P-EIT): Necessarily, temporal objects will continue to exist in the absence of causally destructive factors. Existenti
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