Faculty Salary Inversion, Compression, and Market Salary Gap in California State University Business Schools

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Faculty Salary Inversion, Compression, and Market Salary Gap in California State University Business Schools Pamela Miles Homer 1

2

& Herbert G. Hunt III & Lowell Richard Runyon

3

Accepted: 22 September 2020/ # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020

Abstract

Extant literature has examined salary compression and inversion in US academic institutions including arguments that compression constitutes a form of age discrimination. We assess these phenomena via estimated full rank salaries (across nine campuses in the teaching-oriented California State University (CSU) system) based on the notion that in the absence of compression and inversion, forecasted full rank salaries should be comparable across faculty ranks. Our results show that salary compression is present across all sampled Colleges of Business (COB), but not in other academic CSU colleges. In addition, the patterns of compression support the notion that salaries in CSU COBs are becoming more inverted as the gap between market and current salaries increases. Recommendations for policy and collective bargaining negotiations are also offered. Keywords Salary compression . Salary inversion . Faculty salaries . Salary compression in academia

* Pamela Miles Homer [email protected] Herbert G. Hunt, III [email protected] Lowell Richard Runyon [email protected]

1

Department of Marketing, College of Business, California State University, Long Beach, 1250 Bellflower Boulevard, Long Beach, CA 90840-8503, USA

2

Orfalea College of Business, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA, USA

3

Department of Finance, College of Business, California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA

Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal

Introduction Extant literature has examined the relationship between seniority (or rank) and pay in tenuregranting academic institutions along with proposed remedies (Baker et al. 1994; Barbezat 1989, 2004; Bereman and Lengnick-Hall 1994; Brown and Woodbury 1998; Castle 2005; Duncan et al. 2004; Huseman et al. 1996; Jennings Jr. and McLaughlin 1997; Lamb and Moates 1999; Martinello 2009; Porter et al. 2008; Ransom 1993). Salary inversion and compression in the university workplace and their age discriminatory foundations are wellestablished (e.g., Crow 1994; O’Boyle 2001). [For a discussion of the history of academic salary compression and a literature review of the topic, see Barbezat 2004.] Past research into the seniority-salary relationship typically uses regression-based models that include a host of other independent factors predicted to impact salary such as performance, experience, length of time employed by the institution, and demographic characteristics. However, it is difficult to measure and control for all aspects of faculty productivity related to teaching, research, and service (Duncan et al. 2004, p. 293). In the case of the California State University (CSU) system, such models do not accurately “fit” as promotion raises and potential equity raises are negotiat