FP-Block: Usable Web Privacy by Controlling Browser Fingerprinting

Online tracking of users is used for benign goals, such as detecting fraudulent logins, but also to invade user privacy. We posit that for non-oppressed users, tracking within one website does not have a substantial negative impact on privacy, while it en

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CSC/SnT, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg Open University of the Netherlands, Heerlen, The Netherlands [email protected]

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Abstract. Online tracking of users is used for benign goals, such as detecting fraudulent logins, but also to invade user privacy. We posit that for non-oppressed users, tracking within one website does not have a substantial negative impact on privacy, while it enables legitimate benefits. In contrast, cross-domain tracking negatively impacts user privacy, while being of little benefit to the user. Existing methods to counter fingerprint-based tracking treat crossdomain tracking and regular tracking the same. This often results in hampering or disabling desired functionality, such as embedded videos. By distinguishing between regular and cross-domain tracking, more desired functionality can be preserved. We have developed a prototype tool, FPBlock, that counters cross-domain fingerprint-based tracking while still allowing regular tracking. FP-Block ensures that any embedded party will see a different, unrelatable fingerprint for each site on which it is embedded. Thus, the user’s fingerprint can no longer be tracked across the web, while desired functionality is better preserved compared to existing methods.

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Introduction

Online activities play an ever-growing role in everyday life. Consequently, companies are increasingly tracking users online [14]. There may be various reasons for such tracking, such as fraud prevention by identifying illegitimate usage attempts [16], suggesting related content, and better targeting advertisements. Where such tracking remains confined to the tracker’s own website, the balance between privacy and functionality is (arguably) satisfied: the website learns a user’s browsing habits on that particular website, which helps to improve the website for this user. We will call this type of tracking regular tracking. However, some companies offer online services that are embedded on a large number of websites. Examples of such services are social sharing buttons, popular JavaScript libraries, and popular web analytics services. Thanks to this ubiquitous embedding, such companies can track users over large portions of the web. According to various studies, plenty of different companies are embedded on a sizable1 portion of the Web. For example, consider the Facebook “Like” button. 1

E.g. penetration rates for top 1 million sites according to BuiltWith.com (October 2014): DoubleClick.net 18.5 %, Facebook Like button 15.6 %, Google Analytics 46.6 %.

c Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015  G. Pernul et al. (Eds.): ESORICS 2015, Part II, LNCS 9327, pp. 3–19, 2015. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24177-7 1

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C.F. Torres et al.

The embedding site includes a piece of code that triggers the user’s browser to contact the Facebook servers to download the button. As browsers are made to explain where a request originated (the HTTP Referer field), the browser will tell Facebook exactly which URL triggered this request each time. This enables Facebook to track t