Kant For and Against Human Rights
Kant’s philosophy is considered a major ground for human rights. Indeed, the modern understanding of human rights is heavily based on autonomy as the root of human dignity. Nonetheless, it is arguable whether Kant’s juridical philosophy may accept all the
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Introduction
Kant’s practical philosophy is considered one of the major theoretical grounds of human rights. Although the contemporary conception of autonomy as a person’s capacity to pursue his/her own conception of the good is not identical to Kant’s conception of autonomy as the property of the will of being a law to itself,1 it is safe to say that Kant initiated a tradition that grounds human rights in the capacity of autonomy. After all, it is the capacity of autonomy that distinguishes human beings as ends in themselves: a human being and generally every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means for the discretionary use for this or that will, but 1
Flikschuh. “Personal Autonomy and Public Authority”, 2013, p. 169, n. 1.
A. Pavão • A. Faggion () Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade Estadual de Londrina, Londrina, Paraná, Brazil
© The Author(s) 2016 A. Faggion et al. (eds.), Kant and Social Policies, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-42658-7_3
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must in all its actions, whether directed towards itself or also to other rational beings, always be considered at the same time as an end. (GMS, 4: 428)2
In other words, our moral existence as ends in ourselves is the ground for our entitlement to moral rights corresponding to obligations to each other. Indeed, Kant claims that the principle of humanity as an end in itself is “the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of actions of every human being” (GMS, 4: 430–431).3 Moreover, the connection between human rights and the inviolability of human dignity is confirmed in The Doctrine of Right, where it is asserted that “There is Only One Innate Right” (MS, 6: 237). According to Kant, this innate right is a right belonging to every man (MS, 6: 237). It is a natural right in the sense that (1) human beings have it qua human beings, not because they are members of some society or stand in some relation to others, and (2) it is not created or conferred by voluntary action.4 In fact, Kant says that such a right belongs to every human being by virtue of his/her humanity (MS, 6: 237).5 Thus, a human right for Kant is an innate or natural right grounded in the moral nature of a human being. But what is our only human right? In short, it is “[f ]reedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MS, 6: 237). With this conception in hand, this paper aims to examine whether ideas such as brotherhood and positive/social rights6—as species of human rights—might be grounded in our only human right. 2 References to Kant’s works embedded in the text are formed by the standard abbreviations of the German titles, followed by the volume number in Academy edition (the Akademie Ausgabe) of Kant’s writings in which the work is included, and by the page number in that volume. 3 Thus, Bielefeldt is therefore right to claim that Kant’s philosophy of human rights rests on the inviolability of human dignity (Bielefeldt. “A filosofia
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