Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind
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Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind Lisa Bastian1
The Author(s) 2019
Abstract This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief. Keywords Epistemic rationality Right-kind reasons Wrong-kind reasons Coherence Pragmatic reasons
1 Introduction This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief. & Lisa Bastian [email protected] 1
Arche´ Research Centre, University of St Andrews, 17-19 College Street, St Andrews KY16 9AL, UK
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L. Bastian
Here is the plan of the paper: I first spell out the distinction between reasons of the right and wrong kind for belief and relate it to an evidentialist conception of epistemic rationality, which seems to naturally suggest itself (Sect. 2). I then show that it is not obvious that this is the only plausible conception—the distinction leaves room for others. My diagnosis of why this conception has become the default is that people generally and implicitly assume that the rationality and the correctness of a belief converge. The coherentist conception of epistemic rationality, which I explore and motivate, challenges precisely this convergence and also provides us with an example of a pragmatic reason of the right kind (Sect. 3). I finish by considering some objections (Sect. 4) and by noting the importance of specifying standards of correctness and rationality conceptions for debates about rationality in general (Sect. 5).
2 Reasons: the right and wrong kind My aim in this paper is to highlight the importance of specifying the conception of epistemic rationality underlying philosophical discussions before drawing substantial conclusions. Whilst this might sound like nit-picky methodology, there is a real danger attached to not doing so. In particular, one runs the risk of begging the question against subscribers of competing conceptions, thereby weakening the strength of the overall argument. If whatever conclu
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