On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics
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On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics A. R. J. Fisher
Received: 30 June 2014 / Accepted: 27 January 2015 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract David Lewis objected to theories that posit necessary connections between distinct entities and to theories that involve a magical grasping of their primitives. In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis objected to nondescript ersatzism on these grounds (and thus branded it as ‘magical’). The literature contains several reconstructions of Lewis’ critique of nondescript ersatzism but none of these interpretations adequately address his main argument because they fail to see that Lewis’ critique is based on broader methodological considerations. I argue that a closer look at his methodology reveals the broader objection he presented against nondescript ersatzism. This objection, I further argue, remains a challenge for the ersatzer who posits structure-less entities as possible worlds. Keywords
Lewis · Magic · Method
1 Introduction David Lewis objected to theories that posit necessary connections between distinct entities and to theories that involve a magical grasping of their primitives. In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis objected to nondescript ersatzism on these grounds (and thus branded it as ‘magical’).1 Nondescript ersatzism is the view that possible worlds are structure-less abstract simples that represent in virtue of standing in the relation of selection to the concrete world. It is a metaphysic of modality that rivals,
1 This view is usually called ‘magical ersatzism’. I call it ‘nondescript ersatzism’ to emphasise the fact that it is the theory’s property of being nondescript rather than being magical that is of most importance.
A. R. J. Fisher (B) School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Arthur Lewis Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK e-mail: [email protected]
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Synthese
inter alia, linguistic ersatzism, pictorial ersatzism and modal realism. Lewis’ critique of nondescript ersatzism is thought to solely consist in the following argument or dilemma: (P1) Either the selection relation is internal or external.2 (P2) If the selection relation is internal, our concept of it is ungraspable, except by magic. (P3) If the selection relation is external, it is magical. (C) Thus, nondescript ersatzism should be rejected (because we should avoid magic). The argument for (P2) is usually taken to be an argument that appeals to the fact that abstract simples are beyond our causal ken. Since these entities are out of our causal reach, we cannot identify which particular simple stands in the selection relation to the concrete world being a certain way. Hence, we cannot understand how the selection relation holds between two things. However, Lewis’ allusion to the fact that abstract simples are beyond our acquaintance is not the main reason why he endorses (P2). His argument for (P2) is really an instance of the methodological strictures he imposes upon competing theories. In addition, Lewis’ critique o
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