On the Very Idea of (Real) Content Derivation
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On the Very Idea of (Real) Content Derivation Amir Horowitz 1 Received: 13 February 2020 / Revised: 26 March 2020 / Accepted: 10 August 2020 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract According to an idea which is widespread among philosophers, linguistic entities derive their intentionality from the intentionality of mental entities by virtue of some relation between them. Typically, it is some kind of intention on the speaker’s part – e.g., an intention to produce in the hearer a belief with a certain content – that is supposed to endow words with content. This paper argues that the concept of the derivation of content from one entity to another, if understood realistically, is flawed: derived intentionality, I will argue, is merely ascribed intentionality, not a real property of its possessor (one which is independent of any stance or interpretation). Irrealistic-ascriptivist senses are suggested for the ideas of content derivation, of original intentionality, and of the mind as the source of linguistic (and other forms of non-mental) intentionality. Thus, endorsing the idea that mental intentionality is the source of non-mental intentionality need not tempt one to intentional realism. In an intentional irrealistic framework, what forms of intentionality are original and what are derived is a deeply contingent matter, determined by our practice(s) of content ascription. But while intentional irrealism accommodates all those ideas, this paper defends “contentderivation irrealism” but not thoroughgoing intentional irrealism – the idea that there is real original (that is, un-derived) intentionality is not ruled out. Still, assuming that some entities possess real intentionality, what can make them endow intentionality upon other entities is also our practice of content ascription. Keywords Intentionality . Content . Meaning . Derived Intentionality . Original
Intentionality . Content Derivation . Intentional Realism . Intentional Irrealism
“Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went on. "I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least–at least I mean what I say–that's the same thing, you know."
* Amir Horowitz [email protected]
1
Department of History, Philosophy, and Judaic Studies, The Open University of Israel, 1 University Rd, P.O. Box808, 4353701 Ra’anana, Israel
Philosophia
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter. "You might just as well say that "I see what I eat" is the same thing as "I eat what I see"!” ― Lewis Carroll
1 Introduction There is a common and quite natural story about the intentionality of language (and of other non-mental things) and that of the mind. Language, it is assumed, does not have its intentionality (or meaning) by its own right.1 Rather, linguistic entities inherit, or derive, their intentionality from the intentionality of mental entities by virtue of some relation between them. The mind animates the (otherwise) dead letters of language. This is the first stage of the story. Of course, it is not a complete story even with respect to the intentionality of language; in
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