Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting
This book presents the latest research in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain
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Norman Schofield
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Gonzalo Caballero
Editors
Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting
Editors Prof. Norman Schofield Washington University in St. Louis Center in Political Economy Brookings Drive 1 Campus Box 1027 Saint Louis MO 63130 USA [email protected]
Assoc. Prof. Gonzalo Caballero University of Vigo Faculty of Economics Lagoas Marcosende 36310 Vigo Spain [email protected]
ISBN 978-3-642-19518-1 e-ISBN 978-3-642-19519-8 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011930808 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: eStudio Calamar S.L. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero Part I: Institutions Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Avner Greif and Christopher Kingston War, Wealth and the Formation of States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Carles Boix, Bruno Codenotti, and Giovanni Resta Why Do Weak States Prefer Prohibition to Taxation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Desiree A. Desierto and John V.C. Nye Self-Enforcing, Public-Order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation, Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice, 1050–1350 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Yadira Gonza´lez de Lara Judicial Stability During Regime Change: Apex Courts in India 1937–1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Alfred W. Darnell and Sunita Parikh Institutional Arrangements Matter for Both Efficiency and Distribution: Contributions and Challenges of the New Institutional Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Fernando Toboso
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