Resource allocation in transboundary tuna fisheries: A global analysis
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Resource allocation in transboundary tuna fisheries: A global analysis Katherine Seto , Grantly R. Galland, Alice McDonald, Angela Abolhassani, Kamal Azmi, Hussain Sinan, Trent Timmiss, Megan Bailey, Quentin Hanich
Received: 1 October 2019 / Revised: 13 March 2020 / Accepted: 15 July 2020
Abstract Resource allocation is a fundamental and challenging component of common pool resource governance, particularly transboundary fisheries. We highlight the growing importance of allocation in fisheries governance, comparing approaches of the five tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (tRFMOs). We find all tRFMOs except one have defined resources for allocation and outlined principles to guide allocation based on equity, citizenship, and legitimacy. However, all fall short of applying these principles in assigning fish resources. Most tRFMOs rely on historical catch or effort, while equity principles rarely determine dedicated rights. Further, the current system of annual negotiations reduces certainty, trust, and transparency, counteracting many benefits asserted by rights-based management proponents. We suggest one means of gaining traction may be to shift conversations from allocative rights toward weighting of principles already identified by most tRFMOs. Incorporating principles into resource allocation remains a major opportunity, with important implications for current and future access to fish. Keywords Common pool resource Equity Regional fisheries management organization RFMO
INTRODUCTION Resource allocation is a fundamental and challenging component of common pool resource (CPR) governance (Ostrom 1990, 2003). In the last three decades, a robust and Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-020-01371-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
well-developed literature has considered the conditions under which enduring institutions are able to avert the tragedy of the commons, and sustainably manage CPRs without compromising the resource base (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002; Cox et al. 2010; Agrawal, 2014). However, substantially less research has explored the ways in which those resources are allocated among users, and the implications for fairness, equity, and justice (Agrawal 2003; Albin 2003; Ostrom 2003). In her seminal work, Ostrom emphasizes both these components of good CPR governance, stating that successful CPRs are able to ‘‘allocate resource units and at the same time avoid the conflict, uncertainty, and perceived unfairness of a poorly solved assignment problem…’’ (Ostrom 1990). Transboundary fisheries are a particularly challenging CPR. Several studies have identified characteristics and conditions important to facilitating successful management of CPRs (Wade 1988; Schlager et al. 1994; Agrawal 2001), with some of the most common including small group size, well-defined resource system boundaries, clear user group membership, ease of monitoring and enforcement, and proxim
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