Running out of steam? A political incentive perspective of FDI inflows in China
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Running out of steam? A political incentive perspective of FDI inflows in China Danqing Wang1, Zhitao Zhu2, Shuo Chen3 and Xiaowei Rose Luo4 1
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China; 2 The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China; 3 Fudan University, Shanghai, China; 4 INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France Correspondence: D Wang, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China e-mail: [email protected]
Abstract Drawing on the sociological literature of state bureaucracy, we develop a political incentive perspective on FDI inflows. We argue that political term, as a core feature of career advancement in state bureaucracy, influences the incentives of newly appointed government officials and in turn their efforts toward achieving the state’s goal of attracting FDI. Due to the mandatory retirement age which limits the career advancement, officials in their first terms perceive that they have better chances of promotion and hence have stronger incentives to work toward advancement than those continuing to serve in the current position for the following term. We test this argument by examining Chinese city government leaders and FDI inflows in their cities from 2003 to 2010, using a difference-in-differences design. The results show that first-term leaders, who are newly appointed after political turnover, attract more FDI inflows than continuing leaders. The difference is smaller when the new leaders are close to retirement, but greater if they are appointed to cities with low prior GDP performance. This study offers a new perspective on intra-country FDI variations, and extends the literature on the role of political institutions by investigating the political incentives of government officials. Journal of International Business Studies (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-020-00366-2 Keywords: bureaucracy; political incentives; FDI inflows; China; difference-in-differences
Received: 1 January 2020 Revised: 14 June 2020 Accepted: 7 August 2020
INTRODUCTION The influence of political institutions on foreign direct investment (FDI) has long been recognized. Political institutions that impose few checks and balances on government officials’ discretion can generate high political risk and deter FDI (Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2003; Kobrin, 1979), while changes in political leadership at the national and local government levels can lead to policy discontinuity and volatility, which also negatively affect foreign investors (Fails, 2014; Henisz & Delios, 2004; Jamison, Rosenbaum, & Carter, 2017; Vaaler, Schrage, & Block, 2005). While the uncertainties and challenges presented by political institutions have been investigated in the literature, how they may also produce opportunities for foreign investors is relatively under examined (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006). Specifically, the political career-based incentives and the motivations for officials to attract foreign investment require further attention.
A political incentive perspective
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