Security Flaws of Off-Line Micro Payment Scheme with Dual Signatures
Wuu et al. proposed their off-line micro-payment scheme with dual signatures to provide customers’ anonymity. However, some security flaw is pointed out. To remove this flaw, the channel between bank and trusted party and the channel between the bank and
- PDF / 239,034 Bytes
- 5 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 22 Downloads / 152 Views
Abstract Wuu et al. proposed their off-line micro-payment scheme with dual signatures to provide customers’ anonymity. However, some security flaw is pointed out. To remove this flaw, the channel between bank and trusted party and the channel between the bank and customers should be authenticated and secure. Keywords Blind signatures
Payword chains Micro payment
Introduction Micro payment provides electronic payment mechanisms for small value transactions over networks. Due to the small value of each transaction, the computation and communication costs of a micro payment should be low. Among the proposed micro payment schemes [1–15], the payword chain [11] is the famous technique to reduce the computation cost of each transaction. Wuu et al. [14] proposed the off-line micro payment scheme with dual signatures to provide anonymity for customers. To provide customers’ anonymity, a trusted authority and a trusted issuer, are involved. The trusted authority authenticates and authorizes the pseudo public keys for each customer. Since the authorized pseudo public keys are validated only by the issuer, the bank needs the help of the issuer to validate the customer’s pseudo public key. The issuer also generates some anonymous payword chain and obtains the bank’s authorization by the blind signature scheme [2] to break the link between the payword chain and the customer. Since the bank cannot authenticate the customer and knows the blind signature on payword chains, a security flaw occurs. S.-J. Hwang (&) Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, TamKang University, Tamsui, New Taipei City 251, Taiwan, Republic of China e-mail: [email protected]
Y.-M. Huang et al. (eds.), Advanced Technologies, Embedded and Multimedia for Human-centric Computing, Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering 260, DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-7262-5_103, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
905
906
S.-J. Hwang
Table 1 Notation description Notation Description N Life T H() Hn(•) PKX, SKX PPKX, PSKX \Data[K SigX(Data)
An amount of coins withdrawn by a consumer Coin expiration date Timestamp Public hash function Hn(•) = H(Hn-1(•)) and H1(•) = H(•) Long-term public and secret key pair of the participate X Pseudo public and secret key pair chosen by some customer The ciphertext of data encrypted/decrypted with key K in public cryptosystems A digital signature generated by participate X and SigX(Data) = Data||\H(Data)[SKX
Section Review of Off-Line Micro Payment Scheme with Dual Signatures. Section Security Flaw describes the security flaws of the off-line micro payment scheme. The final section is our Conclusion.
Review of Off-Line Micro Payment Scheme with Dual Signatures The off-line micro payment scheme with dual signatures includes five kinds of participants: Consumer C, merchant M, bank B, issuer I, and trusted authority TA. The scheme contains four phases: Register, withdrawal, payment, and deposit phases. Table 1 defines the notations.
Register Phase A customer C has to register at TA to obtain an e
Data Loading...
