Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information Informat
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-
- PDF / 3,904,542 Bytes
- 208 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 76 Downloads / 250 Views
650
Founding Editors: M. Beckmann H.P. Künzi Managing Editors: Prof. Dr. G. Fandel Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften Fernuniversität Hagen Feithstr. 140/AVZ II, 58084 Hagen, Germany Prof. Dr. W. Trockel Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung (IMW) Universität Bielefeld Universitätsstr. 25, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany Editorial Board: H. Dawid, D. Dimitrov, A. Gerber, C-J. Haake, C. Hofmann, T. Pfeiffer, R. Slowiński, W.H.M. Zijm
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/300
.
Guido Voigt
Supply Chain Coordination in Case of Asymmetric Information Information Sharing and Contracting in a Just-in-Time environment
Guido Voigt Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg Chair of Production and Logistics Postfach 4120 39016 Magdeburg Germany
ISSN 0075-8442 ISBN 978-3-642-20131-8 e-ISBN 978-3-642-20132-5 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20132-5 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2011933104 # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: eStudio Calamar S.L. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Preface
Supply Chain Management has developed to one of the hottest topics over the last two decades both in business research and business practice. Research has contributed quite a lot to support our understanding concerning the impact of the institutional framework and distribution of information on decision making within a supply chain. One of the main questions in this context was how to avoid or, at least, reduce supply chain efficiency losses that are caused by insufficient alignment of goals of independent and selfish actors in such a business relationship. Thereby, main focus lay on the role that contracts between business partners can play for coordinating objectives and actions of supply chain decision makers in such a way that individual actors simultaneously do the best for their own company and for the supply chain as a whole. Nowadays, we know much about the built-in inefficiency of the simple wholesale price contract and about the design of contracts that achieve coordination for various action fields and supply chain structures. The overwhelming majo
Data Loading...
