The Exclusion of Malicious Routing Peers in Structured P2P Systems

We propose a scheme which excludes malicious routing peers from the normal routing process of structured P2P systems such as Chord. This scheme prevents continuous routing overheads from malicious peers. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme re

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Abstract. We propose a scheme which excludes malicious routing peers from the normal routing process of structured P2P systems such as Chord. This scheme prevents continuous routing overheads from malicious peers. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme reduces the average routing length compared with the routing algorithm only using the alternate lookup path.

1 Introduction Structured peer-to-peer (P2P) systems such as Chord [1], CAN [2], and Pastry [3] provide good characteristics such as load balance, decentralization, scalability and availability when their algorithms are executed correctly. The routing algorithms are especially important because the peers place and lookup data deterministically using robust routing algorithms. Therefore, incorrect lookup routing is a serious problem in structured P2P systems. It means that malicious peers deliver query messages to incorrect or non-existing nodes. Even a small number of malicious peers can prevent correct message delivery and cause large overheads. Existing approaches for solving incorrect lookup routing are based on the concept of secure message forwarding. It is to deliver the message to good peers who are responsible with the query message in the presence of malicious peers. For example, there are techniques such as the iterative routing [4], the redundant routing [5] and the alternate lookup path [6]. However, even though these techniques securely delivere messages at once, malicious peers can participate again in the routing protocols. Therefore, lookups would continue to be routed to the malicious peers, which would increase the routing overheads. In this paper, we propose a scheme which excludes the malicious routing peers from the normal routing process of structured P2P systems. This scheme prevents continuous routing overheads from existing malicious nodes. The proposed scheme has four characteristics. First, it is a fully distributed scheme to exclude malicious routing peers. Second, it makes the system work well even in the high ratio of malicious peers in the overlay. Third, it allows the arbitrary behavior of malicious routing peers. Fourth, it uses the alternate lookup path [6] and the query observation [4]. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related works and their differences with our work are discussed. In Section 3 and 4, the adversary model and the characteristics of the proposed system are described. Section 5 describes the exclusion routing protocol. Section 6 shows the simulation results. Finally, we summarize this paper and discuss concluding remarks in Section 7. S. Joseph et al. (Eds.): AP2PC 2006, LNAI 4461, pp. 43–50, 2008. c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008 

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2 Related Works In this section, we briefly discuss the previous works which deal with incorrect lookup routing in structured P2P systems. Sit and Morris [4] proposed the iterative routing using a query observation to defend against incorrect lookup routing. At each hop, the querier checks if the lookup gets clo