The incentives account of feasibility
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The incentives account of feasibility Zofia Stemplowska1
Accepted: 8 February 2020 The Author(s) 2020
Abstract In Utopophobia Estlund offers a prominent version of a conditional account of feasibility. I think the account is too permissive. I defend an alternative incentives account of feasibility (of action). The incentives account preserves the spirit of the conditional account but qualifies fewer actions as feasible. Simplified, the account holds that an action is feasible if there is an incentive such that, given the incentive, the agent is likely to perform the action successfully. If we accept that ought implies feasible, then we should reject some normative requirements on agents that Estlund would accept in light of his more permissive conditional account. But we can still recognise normative requirements on individual and collective agents that, if complied with, would result in a world that is radically better than our own. Keywords Feasibility Utopophobia Estlund Lawford-Smith
Some instances of utopophobia may be due to an overly narrow understanding of when actions that can be required of individuals and groups are feasible. Such instances can then presumably be cured with more permissive accounts, that is accounts that would qualify more actions as feasible. In Utopophobia (2019) and his earlier work (2008; 2011), Estlund offers a prominent version of such a permissive account: the conditional account of feasibility. I think the account is too permissive. I will instead defend an alternative incentives account of feasibility (of action). The incentives account
& Zofia Stemplowska [email protected] 1
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
123
Z. Stemplowska
preserves the spirit of the conditional account but qualifies fewer actions as feasible.1 Simplified, the account holds that an action is feasible if there is an incentive such that, given the incentive, the agent is likely to perform the action successfully. Since I will also assume (without argument) that ought implies feasible, it will follow that I would reject some normative requirements on agents that Estlund would accept in light of his more permissive conditional account. Though, as my account preserves the spirit of the conditional account, it is still an account that is friendly to accepting normative requirements on individual and collective agents that, if complied with, would result in a world that is radically better than our own. Section 1 contains definitions. Section 2 outlines the conditional account. Section 3 argues that the conditional account, including Estlund’s, overidentifies cases of feasible individual action. Section 4 offers the incentives account of feasibility as the solution. Section 5 argues that the conditional account, as developed by Estlund, overidentifies cases of feasible collective action. Section 6 offers the incentives account as the solution and defends it further in light of Lawford-Smith’s analysis of the feasibility of collective action. Section 7 concludes. Utopophobia is a monum
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