The intuitive cooperation hypothesis revisited: a meta-analytic examination of effect size and between-study heterogenei
- PDF / 3,426,427 Bytes
- 17 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 0 Downloads / 192 Views
The intuitive cooperation hypothesis revisited: a meta‑analytic examination of effect size and between‑study heterogeneity Amanda Kvarven3 · Eirik Strømland3 · Conny Wollbrant5 · David Andersson1 · Magnus Johannesson2 · Gustav Tinghög1 · Daniel Västfjäll1 · Kristian Ove R. Myrseth4 Received: 23 May 2019 / Revised: 27 November 2019 / Accepted: 23 January 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract The hypothesis that intuition promotes cooperation has attracted considerable attention. Although key results in this literature have failed to replicate in pre-registered studies, recent meta-analyses report an overall effect of intuition on cooperation. We address the question with a meta-analysis of 82 cooperation experiments, spanning four different types of intuition manipulations—time pressure, cognitive load, depletion, and induction—including 29,315 participants in total. We obtain a positive overall effect of intuition on cooperation, though substantially weaker than that reported in prior meta-analyses, and between studies the effect exhibits a high degree of systematic variation. We find that this overall effect depends exclusively on the inclusion of six experiments featuring emotion-induction manipulations, which prompt participants to rely on emotion over reason when making allocation decisions. Upon excluding from the total data set experiments featuring this class of manipulations, between-study variation in the meta-analysis is reduced substantially—and we observed no statistically discernable effect of intuition on cooperation. Overall, we fail to obtain compelling evidence for the intuitive cooperation hypothesis. Keywords Cooperation · Dual-process · Intuition · Time pressure · Cognitive load
Amanda Kvarven and Eirik Strømland contributed equally to this work. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s4088 1-020-00084-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. * Kristian Ove R. Myrseth [email protected] Extended author information available on the last page of the article
13
Vol.:(0123456789)
A. Kvarven et al.
1 Introduction The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) stipulates that intuitive decisions drive cooperative behavior and that reflective control overrides a cooperative ‘default’ behavior to produce selfish decisions (Bear and Rand 2016; Rand et al. 2014). According to the SHH, intuitive decisions tend to rely on experience from games encountered in everyday life, where interactions typically are repeated and involve opportunities for sanctions; deliberation adjusts behavior to the optimal self-interested response in the situation at hand. The SHH, however, conflicts with suggestions elsewhere in the literature that deliberative processing supports pro-social decision making (e.g., Achtziger et al. 2015; Martinsson et al. 2012; Stevens and Hauser 2004). Moreover, several studies have failed to find a relationship between pro-social behavior and canonical manipulations of cognitive processes (e.g.
Data Loading...
