The modal problem of creatio ex nihilo
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The modal problem of creatio ex nihilo Pao‑Shen Ho1 Received: 30 July 2019 / Accepted: 29 October 2019 © Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract I first provide an interpretation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo based on the Fourth Lateran Council, according to which God creates from nothing if and only if God creates everything except God Himself. I then show that this doctrine entails the modal problem that it is both possible and not possible that there is nothing at all except God, or alternatively, that it is both necessary and not necessary that there is something else besides God. I proceed to examine several proposals to solve the problem, and find them all inadequate. Therefore, I conclude that creatio ex nihilo violates modal logic and is necessarily false. Keywords Creatio ex nihilo · Modality · Divine freedom · Divine omnipotence
Introduction On a first approximation, to create X is to bring X into existence, to cause X to exist, or to actualize X. Call this the basic meaning of creation. It immediately raises many questions concerning existence and modality. For example, how can X be brought into existence and even be susceptible of causation, if X does not somehow already exist in the first place? But if X somehow already exists in the first place, does not X come to exist in two different ways at once after it is caused to exist? In reverse, if X is brought into existence without first existing in some potential state prior to actu‑ ality, does it not imply that if X exists then it exists necessarily? If this is the case, does X still exist even if it is not created? These difficult questions will not be directly addressed in this article. For our pre‑ sent subject, just note that the basic meaning of creation captures our ordinary intui‑ tion about what creation is or consists in, and that it is presupposed in several issues of contemporary philosophy of religion. For example, according to a brief formula‑ tion of the problem of evil, if God exists and is perfectly powerful, knowledgeable * Pao‑Shen Ho [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, Soochow University, Renai Road 199, Suzhou Industry Park, Suzhou City, Jiangsu Province, China
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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
and good, then there would be no pain and suffering; but there are pain and suf‑ fering; therefore, either God does not exist or He is not perfectly powerful, knowl‑ edgeable and good. Here the notion of creation is relevant to the extent that God is held responsible either for creating evil or for not preventing evil from being cre‑ ated. Furthermore, according to the problem of divine freedom, if God is omnisci‑ ent, omnipotent and morally perfect, then He could not do otherwise than to create the best possible world; but if God could not do otherwise, then He creates the best possible world not freely but necessarily. Here the act of creation is understood as an instance of divine agency, which is then held to be a sufficient condition for divine freedom: God is a creator just
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