What Could a Two-Way Power Be?
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What Could a Two-Way Power Be? Kim Frost1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract Alvarez and Steward think the power of agency is a two-way power; Lowe thinks the will is. There is a problem for two-way powers. Either there is a unified description of the manifestation-type of the power, or not. If so, two-way powers are really one-way powers. If not, two-way powers are really combinations of one-way powers. Either way, two-way powers cannot help distinguish free agents from everything else. I argue the problem is best avoided by an Aristotelian view, which posits a distinctive unity of explanation proper to two-way powers, grounded in a distinctive form of reasoning. Keywords Two-way powers · Rational powers · Power individuation · Freedom · Forms of explanation · Refraining
1 Introduction Alvarez (2013) and Steward (2012) think the power of agency is a two-way power; Lowe (2008, 2013) thinks the will is. A two-way power is a power that has two opposed kinds of exercise, where those exercises seem to manifest some kind of freedom.1 For example, when conditions are right, I can (choose to) bet or refrain from betting. These are opposed kinds of exercise of my two-way power to (choose to) act or refrain and it’s somehow “up to me” which exercise ensues when conditions are right.2 One-way powers have one unified kind of exercise. For example, I might fall under gravitational influence. When conditions are right for exercise of this (passive) one-way power I just fall under gravitational influence, and it’s not up to me whether I fall or not. All powers have trivially different kinds of exercise. I might cry on Monday, Tuesday, etc. That doesn’t imply the power to cry is a “seven-way power” (one “way” per day). In this context, talk of “two ways” is supposed to track a deep difference between kinds of exercise, not a trivial one. Alvarez, Steward, and Lowe don’t provide clear criteria for distinguishing deep differences in kinds of exercise from
* Kim Frost [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, Hall of Languages 541, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA
trivial ones. But this is a difficult problem for any powers theory, and no one has an excellent, generally accepted solution to it. In what follows I assume that there is a distinction between deep and trivial differences in kinds of exercise, and that theorists can take for granted our rough, intuitive grasp of that distinction, and that two-way powers are supposed to involve a deep difference between the relevant “two ways”, not a merely trivial one. Alvarez, Steward, and Lowe think that two-way powers are a special kind of power, quite distinct from every other kind of power. Alvarez (2013, p. 102) says there is “human agency whenever we exercise a distinctive kind of power— namely, a two-way power.” Steward says “[the] power to act … is a two-way power: to act or refrain from acting. That is what makes it special.” (2012, p. 155). Lowe says “the will is a two-way power—and in this respect it appears to be utterly unlike any other power to be
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