Review of Imran Aijaz, Islam: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation
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Review of Imran Aijaz, Islam: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation London & New York: Routledge, 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-91022-5, pb, xii+128 pp. Ferhat Yöney 1 Accepted: 28 September 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
The recent work by Imran Aijaz, Islam: A Contemporary Philosophical Investigation, presents a critical survey of the views of Muslim thinkers on the relationship between faith and reason throughout Islamic history. The book consists of six chapters. In the first chapter, Aijaz seeks to categorize the various views found in mainstream Sunni Islam, and provides a brief history of each. He first divides these views broadly into two categories: anti-rationalistic fideism and theistic rationalism. The former is defined as ‘the view that revelation precedes reason in determining the truth of religious (Islamic) belief,’ and the latter is defined as ‘the view that reason precedes revelation in determining the truth of religious (Islamic) belief’ (p. 2). Aijaz further divides anti-rationalistic fideism into two different perspectives based on their degree of willingness to use reason on religious issues. Aijaz calls ‘[t]hose … who showed little or no interest in reason when discussing the truth about religious matters’ (p. 2), adherents of traditional fideism. He dubs ‘the anti-rationalistic fideists who incorporated reason significantly into their discussion of the truth about religious matters’ (p. 3), adherents of ‘scholastic fideism.’ For the next three chapters, Aijaz considers and refutes fideist views in Islamic thought. In Chapter 2, he takes the arguments of Hanbalite theologian Muwaffaq adDin b. Qudama (d. 1223) as a classical case that represents traditional fideism. Aijaz presents two arguments by Qudama on the impermissibility of rational speculation, including kalām, in matters concerning Islamic belief. The first argument is that the Qur’an, the Sunnah (deeds of the Prophet Muhammad), and the consensus of Islamic scholars (‘ijma) show us that rational speculation about Islamic belief is forbidden. The second argument rejects the imposition of an obligation upon ordinary Muslims to engage in independent critical thinking (ijtihad) on religious matters. One reason for this rejection is that it would be beyond their capacity and would only yield unsound
* Ferhat Yöney [email protected]
1
Philosophy Department, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul, Turkey
F. Yöney
speculations; also, it would lead to undesirable consequences, such as being prevented from devoting themselves to their livelihood. In Chapter 3, Aijaz considers al-Ghazali’s (d. 1111) thought which he takes to represent scholastic fideism. Al-Ghazali, based on his epistemic standards for knowledge, controverts the attempts by different schools of Islamic thought (e.g., kalam) to justify religious beliefs. Furthermore, Al-Ghazali sought to justify the Sufi way by arguing that because the Sufis seek to reach faith by ‘fruitional experience’ and actual commitment to the Sufi way of life, and consider nubuwwa (prophecy) as
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