Security for cyber-physical systems: Secure control against known-plaintext attack
- PDF / 140,388 Bytes
- 10 Pages / 612 x 792 pts (letter) Page_size
- 97 Downloads / 194 Views
Print-CrossMark
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11431-020-1621-y
Special Topic: Industrial Artificial Intelligence
. Article .
Security for cyber-physical systems: Secure control against known-plaintext attack YUAN Ye1 & MO YiLin2* 1
School of Artificial Intelligence and Automation, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China; 2
Department of Automation, BNRist, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China Received March 2, 2020; accepted May 6, 2020; published online July 6, 2020
There has been a surge of interests in the security of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), yet it is commonly assumed that the adversary has a full knowledge of physical system models. This paper argues that such an unrealistic assumption can be relaxed: the adversary might still be able to identify the system model by passively observing the control input and sensory data. In such a setup, the attack with knowledge of input-output data can be categorized as a Known-Plaintext Attack. A necessary and sufficient condition has been provided, under which the adversary can uniquely obtain the knowledge of the underlying physical system. From the defender’s perspective, a secure controller design—which exhibits a low rank structure—is proposed which renders the system unidentifiable to the adversary, while trading off the control system’s performance. Finally, a numerical example has been provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed secure controller design. cyber-physical systems, security, secure control, known-plaintext attack Citation:
Yuan Y, Mo Y L. Security for cyber-physical systems: Secure control against known-plaintext attack. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11431-020-1621-y
1 Introduction Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) embed cyber components such as, widespread sensing, communication, control and computation into physical spaces with the goal of making safer, more efficient and reliable systems [1]. While the use of dedicated communication networks has so far sheltered systems from the outside world, use of off-the-shelf networking and computing, combined with unattended operation of a plethora of devices, leaves several opportunities for malicious entities to inject attacks on CPSs. A wide variety of motivations exist for launching an attack, ranging from economic reasons all the way to terrorism. While the threat of attacks on CPSs tends to be underplayed at times, the Stuxnet worm provided a clear sample of the future to come [2, 3]. A substantial amount of research effort has been dedicated *Corresponding author (email: [email protected])
Sci China Tech Sci, 2020, 63,
to identify possible vulnerabilities of the CPS security and develop countermeasures. To this end, many attack models, such as stealthy attack [4–8], replay attack [9, 10] and covert attack [11], have been proposed by various researchers. However, such attack models often require the perfect knowledge of the physical system model—which may be unrealistic in many practical scenarios—since it usually requires the attacker to gain access to th
Data Loading...
