An Attack Execution Model for Industrial Control Systems Security Assessment
The improved communication and remote control capabilities of industrial control systems equipment have increased their attack surface. As a result, managing the security risk became a challenging task. The consequences of attacks in an industrial control
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EDF R&D, 1 Avenue du G´en´eral de Gaulle, 92140 Clamart, France [email protected] 2 T´el´ecom ParisTech, 46 rue Barrault, 75013 Paris, France {ismail.ziad,jean.leneutre}@telecom-paristech.fr
Abstract. The improved communication and remote control capabilities of industrial control systems equipment have increased their attack surface. As a result, managing the security risk became a challenging task. The consequences of attacks in an industrial control system can go beyond targeted equipment to impact services in the industrial process. In addition, the success likelihood of an attack is highly correlated to the attacker profile and his knowledge of the architecture of the system. In this paper, we present the Attack Execution Model (AEM), which is an attack graph representing the evolution of the adversary’s state in the system after each attack step. We are interested in assessing the risk of cyber attacks on an industrial control system before the next maintenance period. Given a specific attacker profile, we generate all potential attacker actions that could be executed in the system. Our tool outputs the probability and the time needed to compromise a target equipment or services in the system. Keywords: Industrial control systems security Attack graph
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SCADA security
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Introduction
In industrial control systems (ICSs), unpatched vulnerabilities continue to pose a serious threat to the security and safety of these systems. In 2014, most incidents reported by ICS-CERT targeted the energy sector [1]. The impact of cyber attacks on industrial control systems extends in scope, severity and damage than their counterparts in traditional IT systems. The introduction of new communication mediums between the system operator and industrial equipment and the use of off-the-shelf operating systems have increased the attack surface of these systems. The notion that control networks of industrial systems are “air gapped” (isolated from unsecured networks such as the internet) does not hold anymore [2] and the increased number of cyber attacks targeting these systems is a clear indication. In order to assess the potential impact of a cyber attack, utilities need to identify all possible actions that can be undertook by an adversary to compromise critical equipment and services in the control system. c Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 A. B´ ecue et al. (Eds.): CyberICS 2015/WOS-CPS 2015, LNCS 9588, pp. 157–167, 2016. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40385-4 11
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Our main objective is to assess the risk of cyber attacks on industrial control systems before the next maintenance period. The asset owner has to quantify the risk unpatched vulnerabilities pose to the system. A good assessment of the probability of successfully exploiting vulnerabilities in industrial control systems should take into account attackers’ profiles that include their skills, access levels on machines, and their knowledge of the topology of the control system. In order to identify the critical vulnerabilities, w
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