Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia Soviet-Russian and Pol

The Ukraine's emergence as an independent state in 1991 was not accompanied by violence, it may be argued, due to the weak national consciousness of most of its citizens. Dr.Velychenko's latest work compares Soviet with Polish accounts of the Ukraine's pa

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Stephen Velychenko

SHAPING IDENTITY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA

Also by Stephen Velychenko National History as Cultural Process

SHAPING IDENTITY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914-1991 Stephen Velychenko

Palgrave Macmillan

© Stephen Velychenko 1993 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1993 978-0-312-08552-0 All rights reserved. For infonnation, write: Scholarly & Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010 First published in the United States of America 1993 ISBN 978-1-349-60653-5 ISBN 978-1-137-05825-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-05825-6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Velychenko, Stephen. Shaping identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish accounts of Ukrainian history, 1914-1991/ Stephen Velychenko. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Ukraine-Historiography. 2. Historiography-Poland. 3. Historiography-Soviet Union. 4. Ukraine-History-Errors. inventions, etc. 5. Ukraine-History-20th century. 6. Ukraine-History-20th century-Bibliography. I. Title. DKS08,46.V45 1992 947' .71084--22 These ideas were repeated by the majority of speakers at a conference on Iavorsky's view of Ukrainian history. They condemned him for overemphasizing Western influence and ignoring Russian influence on Ukraine, for claiming the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Central Rada government in 1917 were revolutionary, for presenting the history of the USSR as the sum of Republic histories and for not understanding that the 1648 Khmelnytsky uprising had been an "antifeudal" peasant revolt. The comments on nineteenth- and twentieth-century history appeared separately in a formal condemnation by the Istoryk Marksyst editorial committee. Particularly important was the comment that the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and its left wing were not revolutionary in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?3 Guidelines for Party activists condemned interpretation of Ukraine's past as a struggle for statehood led by petty producers who in 1917 produced a third "national democratic revolutionary" center in Ukraine alongside the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government. 24 Thus, as of 1930, in the wake of what was likely a centrally directed offensive, historians risked administrative censure if they claimed Ukraine's historical distinctiveness found expression in a revolutionary bourgeoisie because this idea would deny the pivotal role of the proletariat and its agent, the Bolshevik Party. In 1930, to the list of heresies of distinctiveness were added ideas from the prevailing view of early-modem history. Authors of survey histories were criticized for focusing on interclass as opposed to intraclass conflict thus ignoring the revolutionary role of the peasantry in the seventeenth century and erroneously labeling the Khmelnytsky uprising as a "national bourgeois" revolution against Polish trade capitalism.25 Particularly harsh was Skubytsky, who now directed his barbs at all the leading Ukrainian