Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq
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Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq Judith Kelley Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, Box 90239, Durham, NC 27708, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally, if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject possible cooperation in the short run to improve their influence vis-a`-vis stronger states in the long run. This need not be due to traditional relative gains concern. States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak negotiator will erode future bargaining power and subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve. This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in 2002– 2003. International Politics (2005) 42, 153–173. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800105 Keywords: soft balancing; game theory; Iraq war; transatlantic relations; negotiation; bargaining
Introduction When democratic partners disagree, traditional hard balancing is not a feasible solution. While Europe may boost its relative military capacity to increase its influence as a global actor, Europe is not aligning itself militarily with other states against the United States (US), nor is any increased capability a credible tool for transatlantic conflict resolution, and certainly not in the short run. This by no means renders the power balance inconsequential, however, and therein lays the dilemma for the weaker state. Depending on the structure of the problem faced, power asymmetry may give the stronger party greater capability to go it alone and greater sway with other nations. This affects the respective costs of agreement failure, which enables the stronger nation to hold out longer and ultimately gives it greater ability to obtain its preferred outcome. The weaker actor is therefore in a conundrum: Unwilling to accept inequitable ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ policy solutions, yet unable to balance against the other actor militarily, what is the weaker actor to do to avoid perpetually
Judith Kelley Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing
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being sidelined in decision making and repeatedly obtaining only minor concessions in cooperation? Indeed, work by Liska (1962) and Rothstein’s (1968) study of small power military alliances identified a similar dilemma when noting that the weaker state runs the risk of having its autonomy constrained so severely that it becomes a mere satellite of the stronger state. Using the transatlantic conflict over Iraq, this paper discusses the strategies of structurally weaker actors. I call these soft balanci
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