The arrow of time: Advancing insights into action control from the arrow version of the Eriksen flanker task

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The arrow of time: Advancing insights into action control from the arrow version of the Eriksen flanker task K. Richard Ridderinkhof 1 & Scott A. Wylie 2 & Wery P. M. van den Wildenberg 1 & Theodore R. Bashore Jr. 3 & Maurits W. van der Molen 1 Accepted: 22 September 2020 # The Author(s) 2020

Abstract Since its introduction by B. A. Eriksen and C. W. Eriksen (Perception & Psychophysics, 16, 143–49, 1974), the flanker task has emerged as one of the most important experimental tasks in the history of cognitive psychology. The impact of a seemingly simple task design involving a target stimulus flanked on each side by a few task-irrelevant stimuli is astounding. It has inspired research across the fields of cognitive neuroscience, psychophysiology, neurology, psychiatry, and sports science. In our tribute to Charles W. (“Erik”) Eriksen, we (1) review the seminal papers originating from his lab in the 1970s that launched the paradigmatic task and laid the foundation for studies of action control, (2) describe the inception of the arrow version of the Eriksen flanker task, (3) articulate the conceptual and neural models of action control that emerged from studies of the arrows flanker task, and (4) illustrate the influential role of the arrows flanker task in disclosing developmental trends in action control, fundamental deficits in action control due to neuropsychiatric disorders, and enhanced action control among elite athletes. Keywords Cognitive control and automaticity . Inhibition . Perception and action

A remarkably active and vibrant area of investigation in cognitive science is devoted to articulating the neurocognitive mechanisms that mediate action control. Action control refers to a subset of adaptive cognitive control processes involved in the coordination of one’s instantaneous urges vis-à-vis actions that concord with our intentions or instructions. Our responsiveness to action affordances (alluring and potentiating opportunities for action in a particular situation, some more potent than others; J. J. Gibson, 1979) is guided by our current concerns and intentions; we are responsive not to just any affordance, but to task-relevant affordances. Goals, concerns, prior experience, and instructions have shaped our sensitivity to relevant affordances, such that we are not always captivated by the one action affordance that happens to present the most potent solicitation. But what happens

when we are captured by unsolicited action affordances? What mechanisms do our brains engage to control conflicting actions and mitigate interference with goal-directed behavior? The literature on action control that addresses these fundamental questions encompasses many contributions that are based on the Eriksen flanker task, described in more detail below. While the original version of the task consisted of arrays of letters (a central target letter flanked on each side by letters that were either congruent or incongruent to the target), later versions used other types of symbols, such as colors, geometrical shapes, or a