The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion
- PDF / 340,324 Bytes
- 29 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 2 Downloads / 172 Views
The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion Jonathan Mitchell1
Accepted: 30 September 2020 The Author(s) 2020
Abstract This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered (absence of bodily phenomenology and what kind of bodily awareness). An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motivation for the bodily-attitudinal theory and creates problems for its claims concerning the content of emotional experience. The conclusion is that while the bodily-attitudinal theory marks out a distinctive proposal concerning the question of what emotions are, there remain significant issues which need addressing if it is to be a plausible competitor to existing theories of emotion. Keywords Emotions Body Experience Phenomenology Awareness
1 Introduction The question of what emotions are is the most fundamental issue in the philosophy of emotion. In answering this question in different ways we get diverging theories of emotion. Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed a new theory, the attitudinal theory, which tells us what emotions are. Broadly, the view is that emotions are evaluative attitudes, such that different emotion types are distinct evaluative attitudes. More specifically, emotions are evaluative attitudes towards intentional contents provided by other mental states—their cognitive bases, such as judgements, imaginations, and perceptions. In contrast to Evaluativist views (e.g., & Jonathan Mitchell [email protected] 1
University of Manchester, 24 Oaks Road, Kenilworth, WA CV8 1GE, UK
123
J. Mitchell
Judgementalism and Perceptualism), the relevant contents are claimed to be nonevaluative; thick evaluative properties like the disgusting, dangerous, terrifying, humorous, and admirable—which are connected to the individuation and intelligibility of emotions—are not part of the content of emotional experience. Although, the relevant emotion is correct iff the object provided by the cognitive base exemplifies the relevant evaluative property. As such emotional experiences, as felt evaluative attitudes, stand in intentional relations to values without being about values.1 This paper critically assesses a substantive development of the attitudinal theory, which I call the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion, as expressed in the claim that emotions, as evaluative attitudes, are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness.2 The critical reception of the attitudinal theory has centred around its claims, documented above, concerning the content of emotional experience and the associated epistemology of value and emotion.3 Comparatively less has been said about how the theory is developed in terms of felt bodily attitudes of action readiness—which will be my focus here (as such this paper does not primarily concern the fo
Data Loading...
