The Delegation of Dispute Settlement Authority to Conventional International Governmental Organizations
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The Delegation of Dispute Settlement Authority to Conventional International Governmental Organizations Geoffrey B. Cockerham Department of History and Political Science, Liberal Arts, LA-030, Utah Valley University, 800 West University Parkway, Orem UT 84058, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
The issue of dispute settlement is problematic in the international system because it may conflict with sovereignty. States may find, however, that in order to facilitate cooperation, they should delegate some authority to resolve disputes to a third party. This article seeks to provide a measure for dispute settlement authority and some explanation for the delegation aspect of international cooperation by examining why states agree to grant dispute settlement authority to a particular kind of institutional arrangement, conventional international governmental organizations (IGOs). The analysis reveals that states tend to enter into IGO agreements with a higher degree of dispute settlement authority when members have a greater incentive to defect due either to the large number of other parties to the agreement, or due to greater cooperative demands as provided by the agreement. International Politics (2007) 44, 732–752. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800214 Keywords: delegation; dispute settlement; international governmental organizations institutional design
Introduction Trade and investment flows are becoming increasingly international in character.1 Concurrently, organizations like the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have expanded their authority. States, however, must continue to deal with an international system where the lack of a central authority creates collective action problems that may hinder multilateral relationships. Two major problems hindering these relationships are (1) the lack of information regarding states’ preferences and actions and (2) the incentive that states have to free-ride, or not comply with a cooperative arrangement. To overcome these problems, states often rely on international institutions to provide rules that establish a legal structure for these relationships. An important purpose that these institutions may serve is to resolve conflicts among member states. These states may differ over the
Geoffrey B. Cockerham Delegation of Dispute Settlement Authority
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interpretation of the arrangement, or they may disagree on whether all parties are meeting their obligations. Rather than resolve these disputes through political bargaining, states may delegate authority to the international institution to resolve issues. In examining international institutions, it is apparent that these institutions vary in how much dispute settlement authority has been delegated to them by member states. This feature leads to a highly relevant question of why do some institutions have strong dispute settlement mechanisms, while others have weak or no mechanisms at all? Owing to the anarchical structure of the international system, these authorities only have influence over states because
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