The direct argument is a prima facie threat to compatibilism
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The direct argument is a prima facie threat to compatibilism Ori Beck1 Received: 17 May 2020 / Accepted: 4 September 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In the early 1980’s van Inwagen presented the Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism with moral responsibility. In the course of the ensuing debate, Fischer, McKenna and Loewenstein have replied, each in their own way, that versions of the Direct Argument do not pose even a prima facie threat to compatibilism. Their grounds were that versions of the Direct Argument all use (some version of) the “Transfer NR” inference rule in a dialectically problematic way. I rebut these replies here. By so doing, I hope to set the Direct Argument debate on a more fruitful path. Keywords Free will · Determinism · Compatibilism · Direct argument · Dialectics
I am deeply indebted to David Widerker both for encouraging me to write this paper, and for his insightful suggestions and advice. I am also heavily indebted to several anonymous reviewers for questions, criticisms and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. Further thanks go to the participants of the 2019 Free Will and Methodology conference at KU Leuven, and to the participants of the 2020 Conference of the Israeli Philosophy Association. Their comments and questions were invaluable to me. Finally, my writing was aided by the generous support of the Department of Philosophy and Kreitman School of Advanced Studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
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Ori Beck [email protected] Philosophy Department, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, PO Box 653, 8410501 Beer-Sheva, Israel
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Synthese
Introduction Peter van Inwagen (1983, pp. 182–188) presented a landmark argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. The argument—which came to be known as the Direct Argument—can be expressed thus:1 (1) Determinism is true. Hypothesis (2) [(LAWS & PAST) ⊃ ACT] From (1) (3) [LAWS ⊃ (PAST ⊃ ACT)] From (2) (4) NR[(LAWS ⊃ (PAST ⊃ ACT)] From (3) by rule A (5) NR(LAWS) Premise (6) NR(PAST ⊃ ACT) From (4), (5) by Transfer NR2 (7) NR(PAST) Premise (8) NR(ACT) From (6), (7), by Transfer NR (9) If determinism is true, then NR(ACT) From (1)–(8) Here, “NR(p)” abbreviates “p, and no one is, or ever has been even partly morally responsible for the fact that p”. “LAWS” stands for the conjunction of all the laws of nature. “PAST” stands for some true proposition describing the complete state of the world at some time t before the existence of humans. “ACT” stands for any true proposition describing any action performed by a human agent. Lastly, “” expresses broadly logical necessity, and “⊃” is the material conditional. The two rules of inference used are: (A) p NR(p) (Transfer NR) NR(p), NR(p ⊃ q) NR(q) Is the Direct Argument sound? Well, premises (5) and (7), like the analytic inferences in steps (2), (3) and (9), seem difficult to dispute. It is easier to debate the uses of Transfer NR in steps (6) and (8), and the use of rule A in step (4). Here I focus on Transfer NR.3 The litera
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