The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability
In this volume are papers written by students and co-authors of Stanley Reiter. The collection reflects to some extent the range of his interests and intellectual curiosity. He has published papers in statistics, manage ment science, international trade,
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The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability Essays in Honor of Stanley Reiter
Edited by John O. Ledyard California Institute of Technology Pasadena, CA
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Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The economics of informational decentralization: complexity, efficiency, and stability: essays in honor of Stanley Reijer I edited by John O. Ledyard. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4613-5953-1 ISBN 978-1-4615-2261-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-4615-2261-4
1. Mathematical economics.
HB135.E29 1995 330'.OI'51-dc20
I. Ledyard, John O.
95-32947 CIP
Copyright © 1994 Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1994 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1994 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photo-copying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Springer Science+Business Media. LLC.
Printed on acid-free paper.
Dedicated to Stanley Reiter, Morrison Professor of Economic and Mathematics, Northwestern University
Contents
Contributing Authors
ix
Preface
xi
1 Information Flows Intrinsic to the Stability of Economic Equilibrium J. S. Jordan
2 Mechanisms for the Realization of Equilibria K. R. Mount
35
3 Convergence Theorems for a Class of Recursive Stochastic Algorithms Diego Moreno and Mark Walker
53
4 Efficiency in Partnership When the Joint Output is Uncertain Steven R. Williams and Roy Radner
79
5 Institutional Choice and Institutional Transformation: Perspectives from the Colonial Experience Jonathan Hughes
101
6 An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism Hugo Sonnenschein
119
7 Structured Private Enterprise Edward Ames
131
vii
viii
CONTENTS
8 The Last 1,945 sailing Ships Lance E. Davis and Robert E. Gallman
9
Sufficient Statistics, Utility Theory, and Mechanism Design Donald G. Saari 10
Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale Roy Radner, Timothy Van Zandt 11
A Nash Solution for Multilateral Bargaining Elaine Bennett 12 Communication Requirements for Individual Agents in Networks and Hierarchies Thomas Marschak and Stefan Reichelstein 13 On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games Steven A. Matthews and Andrew Postlewait 14 Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Andrew Postlewaite Index
159
219
243
281
311
347
367 435
Contributing Authors
Elaine Bennet Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Mark Walker University of Arizona
Lance E. Davis California Institute of Technology
Steven R. Williams University of Illinois
James S. Jordan University of Minnesota
Edward Ames Old Lyne, CT
Thomas Marschak University of California, Berkeley
Robert Gallman University of North Carolina
Steve A. Matthews Northwestern University
Jon
