The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action
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The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action José Gabriel Castillo1 · Zhicheng Phil Xu2 · Ping Zhang3 · Xianchen Zhu4 Received: 18 May 2019 / Accepted: 8 September 2020 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2020
Abstract Most observed institutional arrangements, in governments, firms, and other organizations, acknowledge the effectiveness of imposing sanctioning institutions and monitoring policies to achieve particular goals. However, less attention has been paid to the influences of the delegation mechanism of sanctioning power. In particular, it remains unclear whether the mechanism influences the legitimacy of the authority/institution, in centralized institutional arrangements. We report laboratoryexperimental results of a public goods game that compare the performance of exogenous (i.e., the Leviathan) versus endogenous (i.e., the Democracy) delegation of sanctioning power. Observed differences are not statistically significant, regardless of the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, tested in two experiments with different punishment/cost functions. Democratic schemes in centralized power environments should not be taken for granted. Experimental evidence contradicts the common belief of a robust causal relationship between indirect democratic institutions, collective action, and economic outcomes. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s0035 5-020-01284-w) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. * Zhicheng Phil Xu [email protected] José Gabriel Castillo [email protected] Ping Zhang [email protected] Xianchen Zhu [email protected] 1
School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral-ESPOL, Guayaquil, Ecuador
2
School of Economics, Henan University, 85 Minglun Street, Kaifeng 475000, Henan, China
3
China Center for Special Economic Zones, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, China
4
School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China
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1 Introduction One of the main challenges for a society is to motivate and sustain cooperation through its institutions. Theoretically, public goods cannot be efficiently provided through voluntary contribution mechanisms due to free-riding. Paradoxically, substantial evidence in the laboratory and field (Ledyard 1995; Ostrom 1992) shows that individuals consistently deviate from such pessimistic predictions, although cooperation tends to deteriorate over time in the voluntary contribution mechanisms. Beginning with the seminal experiment by Fehr and Gächter (2000a), most related experiments study the effects of decentralized sanctioning institutions, in which every participant has the power to act upon others (punish or reward) within the group.1 An opposing argument, which resembles a Hobbesian view (Hobbes 2006), leans towards the centralized authority of the state as a more efficie
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