The great delusion of engagement: how China should compete with America
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The great delusion of engagement: how China should compete with America Tao Xie1 Received: 22 April 2020 / Accepted: 10 June 2020 © The Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS), Peking University 2020
Abstract Faced with a fundamental shift in America’s China policy, Beijing should have a clear-eyed analysis of its choices and strategies. It is no longer feasible for China to hide its capabilities and bide its time. Instead, competition must be met with competition. Thus, China should rethink how to improve its competitive strength vis-à-vis the United States. Strength stems from not only economic and military power, but also international legitimacy. To bolster its international legitimacy, China should improve relations with its neighbors, enable the international community to have a larger share of its prosperity, articulate broadly appealing political values, and make its national identity more inclusive. These four steps are not confrontational, but they will make China a more formidable competitor vis-à-vis the United States. Keywords China · America · Competition · International legitimacy
1 Introduction The extraordinary rise of China can be attributed to many crucial factors, including its policy of reform and opening up, its massive pool of cheap labor, and its heavy investment in manufacturing and infrastructure. However, without active engagement by the United States, China’s economic miracle certainly would have been delayed (or much less impressive). A cooperative relationship with America has allowed China to access western capital and technology, reap the enormous benefits of international free trade, and enjoy four decades of peace and security in its neighborhood. Since Richard Nixon’s 1972 landmark visit, engagement with China has been the prevailing consensus in Washington, despite occasional setbacks and sporadic tensions in bilateral relations.
* Tao Xie [email protected] 1
School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China
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China International Strategy Review
Now a new consensus appears to be emerging among an increasing number of U.S. officials, analysts, and pundits, one that calls for replacing engagement with getting tough on China (Blackwill and Tellis 2015; Mead 2018; Shambaugh 2017; Zhao 2017). This new consensus grows out of the widespread perception that China has utterly failed to meet the underlying expectations of U.S. engagement, that is, that it would adopt liberal democracy, embrace market capitalism, and submit to U.S. leadership (Campbell and Ratner 2018). In other words, engagement is now widely viewed as nothing more than a great delusion, a wrong-headed conviction in America’s ability to transform China and in China’s amenability to American influence. This new consensus was written into the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy, which labeled China “revisionist power” and “strategic competitor,” respectively (White House 2
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