The Paradox of Deontology and Agent-Centered Restrictions
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The Paradox of Deontology and Agent-Centered Restrictions S. Burtoft 1 Received: 11 July 2019 / Accepted: 21 February 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract The paradox of deontology, as the name suggests, is generally thought to pose a problem for deontological theory, particularly for agent-centered restrictions. I argue that it is neither a paradox nor a problem for restrictions. On the contrary, the cases that are alleged to generate the paradox presuppose restrictions, which shifts the burden to the opponent of restrictions. Keywords Paradox of deontology . Agent-centered . Agent-relative . Restrictions .
Constraints Standard deontological views posit agent-centered restrictions that prohibit the performance of certain actions regardless of how much good they will do overall. The paradox of deontology is typically presented as a puzzle about how to justify these restrictions in cases where their violation would minimize overall violations of the same restriction. Consider the following schematic example discussed by Scheffler. Suppose that if agent A1 fails to violate a restriction R by harming some undeserving person P1, then five other agents, A2 . . . A6, will each violate restriction R by identically harming five other persons, P2 . . . P6, who are just as undeserving as P1, and whom it would be just as undesirable from an impersonal standpoint to have harmed (1985, p. 84).1 The question is why A1 ought to avoid violating R when doing so would prevent a greater number of violations of R. Or, more generally, as Heuer (2011) puts it, “why not violate a restriction if doing so minimizes the violation of that very restriction?” (p. 1 It is assumed that “(1) A1 has no way out of this dilemma, and (2) there are no morally relevant consequences beyond those described in the case” (1983, p. 84).
* S. Burtoft [email protected]
1
School of Foreign Studies, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China
Philosophia
236). So, there is a puzzle here. But does it follow that there is something inherently paradoxical about restrictions? In the case described, A1’s dilemma appears to hinge on two claims about the right course of action: (D) A1 ought not to violate R. (M) A1 ought to prevent A2 . . . A6 from violating R. Given that A1 can prevent A2 . . . A6 from violating R only by violating R then, if (D) and (M) are both true, it follows that A1 ought and ought not to violate R. Thus, on pain of contradiction, (D) and (M) cannot both be true. The air of paradox surrounding restrictions hinges on the idea that complying with restrictions presupposes a commitment to minimizing their violations. If this is right, (D) entails (M), which constitutes a reductio of (D). However, I shall argue that it is the other way around: (D) does not entail (M) but (M) entails (D). The arguments are presented in sections I and II, respectively. The first argument, that (D) does not entail (M), is sufficient to show that there is nothing inherently paradoxical about restrictions. The second argument, that (M) entails (D), further show
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