Theoretical Models of Training and Transfer Effects

The central idea in this chapter is that general cognitive strategies are a by-product of learning specific skills. The PRIMs theory that is based on this idea is capable of making more fine-grained and accurate predictions than the two alternatives: the

  • PDF / 250,332 Bytes
  • 11 Pages / 439.37 x 666.14 pts Page_size
  • 63 Downloads / 177 Views

DOWNLOAD

REPORT


Introduction Despite the large increase in interest and research on cognitive training, there is very little theory that can explain the effectiveness or lack thereof of cognitive training. There are two reasons for this. The first is the prevailing idea that cognitive training is similar to training muscles, and therefore requires little explanation. The second is that most detailed theories of cognitive training assume that what is learned in training is highly specific, which implies that general cognitive training is not really possible. The muscle analogy of cognitive or “brain training” is quite pervasive. In particular, the term “brain training” suggests that it involves a physiological system that needs to become better or stronger (or has to be trained to prevent it from becoming weaker). It is also consistent with a tradition of viewing cognition as a collaboration between a set of cognitive functions or systems. For example, if we consider working memory as a system with a certain capacity, then the logical result of training working memory is the expansion of that capacity. Following the analogy leads to the idea that the various cognitive systems make up the muscles of the mind. However, there are several reasons why the muscle analogy may not be the most appropriate. First of all, the brain is not a muscle, nor anything like a muscle. Moreover, if brain training is like muscle training, why are the results so inconsistent? Reports of unsuccessful training are as common as successful reports, even without considering the publication bias that favors success over null results. Perhaps the successful training or testing regimens find some right combination, and the unsuccessful ones do not (see also Guye et al. this volume; Umanath et al. this volume).

N.A. Taatgen (*) University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 T. Strobach, J. Karbach (eds.), Cognitive Training, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-42662-4_3

19

20

N.A. Taatgen

What makes humans such a successful species is not the strength of muscles, but the capability to fit in almost every niche in nature. In other words, humans are almost infinitely adaptable to different circumstances. Therefore, cognitive training can better be viewed as training and prioritizing of cognitive skills. For example, working memory training may not literally increase our capacity, but instead expand our cognitive strategies for maintaining information for relative short periods of time. This was definitely the case with subject SF in Chase and Ericsson’s digit span training, where SF managed to expand his digit span from an average 7 to around 80 after 44 weeks of practice (Chase and Ericsson 1982). However, SF was not able to use this skill for anything else but digits. This brings us to the second reason why there is little theory about cognitive training, which is the strong belief that skills are seldom transferrable. The origin of this idea stems from Thorndike, who proposed the identi