Theories of Scientific Explanation
In this chapter we first summarize the ideas of Carl Hempel, the godfather of this subdomain of the philosophy of science (Sect. 1.2). Then we present the problems that other philosophers have raised in connection with Hempel’s theory of explanation (Sect
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Theories of Scientific Explanation
1.1 Introduction In this chapter we first summarize the ideas of Carl Hempel, the godfather of this subdomain of the philosophy of science (Sect. 1.2). Then we present the problems that other philosophers have raised in connection with Hempel’s theory of explanation (Sect. 1.3). Subsequently, we clarify how the major research traditions in the field that have emerged after Hempel, can be seen as different reactions to these problems (Sect. 1.4). Finally, we discuss two of these reactions in more detail. Philip Kitcher’s unification account in Sect. 1.5 and Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical account in Sect. 1.6. This chapter gives the reader insights into some of the most important steps in the development of the domain till 1990. More recent developments (e.g. the work of James Woodward, Michael Strevens and the mechanistic approach) are treated in Chap. 3. But even for the period before 1990 we do not aim at completeness. For instance, the work of Bas van Fraassen is also discussed in Chap. 3, not here. The reason for this is that Chap. 2 plays a pivotal role in this book: we criticise the work of Hempel, Kitcher and Salmon at a meta-level and propose an alternative approach which is elaborated in Chaps. 3 and 4. Our criticism in Chap. 2 cannot be understood without knowledge of what these three philosophers have written on explanation. So we focus on their work. The work of other philosophers is saved for later: we try to integrate important insights into the toolbox we develop in Chap. 3.
1.2 Hempel’s Models 1.2.1 The DN Model We start with some definitions and terminology. According to Hempel, an explanation consists of an explanandum E (a description of the phenomenon to be
E. Weber et al., Scientific Explanation, SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-6446-0_1, © The Author(s) 2013
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explained) and an explanans (the statements that do the explaining). He distinguishes between true explanations and explanations that are well-confirmed (see e.g. Hempel 1965, p. 338). Both concepts are defined by means of the auxiliary concept of potential explanans. In order to get a grip on what a potential explanans is, Hempel developed two models: the deductive-nomological model (henceforth: DN model) and the inductive-statistical model (henceforth: IS model). In the DN model, a potential explanans is characterized as follows (cf. Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, part 3): (DN)The ordered couple (L, C) constitutes a potential explanans for the singular sentence E if and only if (1) L is a purely universal sentence and C is a singular sentence, (2) E is deductively derivable from the conjunction L&C, and (3) E is not deductively derivable from C alone. A purely universal sentence consists of one or more universal quantifiers, followed by an expression which contains no quantifiers and no individual constants. (L, C) is a true explanans for E if and only if (L, C) is a potential explanans for E and both L and C are true. (L, C) is a w
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