Using Basic RFID-Based Digital Product Memories for Protection against Counterfeit Goods in Manufacturing Plants
This chapter describes an examplary implementation based on digital product memories in the field of protection against counterfeit goods in manufacturing plants in the SemProM project.
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Abstract This chapter describes an examplary implementation based on digital product memories in the field of protection against counterfeit goods in manufacturing plants in the S EM P RO M project.
1 Introduction To manufacture high-quality goods in a safe manner it is essential to ensure that the production equipment is of high quality and that it is put to use according to the supplier’s guidelines. Counterfeit tools and machinery of low quality or falsified operating instructions can lead to unpredictable or even dangerous results. Since digital product memories are supposed to be trustworthy sources of information, the demand for integrated protection against unauthorized copying and alteration is obvious. Against this background two use cases in the manufacturing domain have been investigated: 1. Unauthorized alteration The supplier of the original equipment has altered the operating instructions in the DPM to mark a low-quality item as high quality. The equipment is put to use in an automated manufacturing plant. The permitted operating conditions for this equipment are read automatically from the DPM and normally the machine’s parameterization would be set accordingly. (An example for such an operating condition is the maximum temperature of a cutting tool in a turning center.) However, the machine’s PLC detects the unauthorized alteration and sounds an alarm. 2. Counterfeiting A forger has constructed a low-quality copy of the equipment including a 1:1 copy of the DPM’s contents. Analogously to in use case 1 the equipment is put to use in an automated manufacturing plant. The machine’s PLC detects that the DPM is an unauthorized copy and sounds an alarm. J. Neidig (B) Siemens AG, Sector Industry, Nuremberg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] W. Wahlster (ed.), SemProM, Cognitive Technologies, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-37377-0_18, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
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Fig. 1 Possible security attacks
The needs of an industrial environment are reflected by additional requirements. The algorithm for testing the DPM must be executable on a typical industrial PLC such as the SIMATIC S7-300. Only minor influences on the performance of the PLC are acceptable. Counterfeiting of components which are directly connected to a communication bus is not considered, because such devices have other means of certified identification. All hardware or software protocols must conform to industrial standards; i.e., no proprietary solutions are considered. Of course, applying the standard S EM P RO M data model and interface is another requirement. Preventing unauthorized read access is not considered here.
2 Overview and State of the Art The primary points of attack in an RFID-based security concept are depicted in Fig. 1. As stated above, only data manipulation scenarios are considered. The points of attack are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Alteration of the data on the RFID-based DPM itself Manipulation of the air interface between the transponder and the RFID reader Changing the firmware of the RFID
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