What the Debasing Demon Teaches Us About Wisdom
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What the Debasing Demon Teaches Us About Wisdom Kevin McCain 1 Received: 30 July 2019 / Accepted: 10 December 2019/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Keywords Debasing demon . Justification . Knowledge . Wisdom
Stephen R. Grimm (2015, 2017) has offered one of the best contemporary theories of wisdom. Like many other contemporary accounts, Grimm’s takes wisdom to be a kind of knowledge.1 In particular, Grimm (2015: 140) argues that three kinds of knowledge are individually necessary for wisdom: (1) Knowledge of what is good or important for well-being. (2) Knowledge of one’s standing, relative to what is good or important for well-being. (3) Knowledge of a strategy for obtaining what is good or important for well-being.2 Despite the initial plausibility of Grimm’s account and his work in defending it, Sharon Ryan (2012, 2017) has attempted to show that any theory that reduces wisdom to a kind of knowledge is flawed. At the heart of her objection lies the thought that “bad epistemic luck should not count against being wise” (2012: 107). In order to motivate her objection to such reductionist theories of wisdom (i.e., theories, such as Grimm’s, that construe wisdom in terms of various kinds of knowledge) Ryan appeals to Cartesian skeptical scenarios where we have 1
For accounts of wisdom that construe it in terms of knowledge see Garrett (1996), Kekes (1983), Nozick (1989), and Tiberius (2008). Although he differs from Grimm, and others, by insisting that there are two kinds of wisdom (theoretical and practical), Baehr (2012) seems to think of both of these as kinds of knowledge. 2 Grimm does not take these three conditions to be jointly sufficient because he thinks that a further condition requiring one to apply this knowledge may be needed. That said, he does not rule out the possibility of his three conditions being jointly sufficient because he is not convinced that akrasia can hinder someone who genuinely meets these three conditions. So, Grimm allows that an appropriate application requirement may already be built into his three conditions.
* Kevin McCain [email protected]
1
Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, University Hall, 5th Floor, 1402 10th Avenue South, Birmingham, AL 35294-1241, USA
K. McCain
someone who is just like a wise person from our world, but who is trapped in the Matrix (or some other skeptical scenario).3 Ultimately, Ryan’s case against reductionist theories of wisdom falls short of being conclusive. Nevertheless, she is correct in claiming that wisdom is not a kind of knowledge, and she is right to look to skeptical scenarios to make this point. Ryan simply looks to the wrong sort of skeptical scenario. Instead of looking to Cartesian skepticism we should focus on debasing skepticism. The activity of a debasing demon, of the sort that Jonathan Schaffer (2010) introduced the philosophical world to, can help us see that wisdom is not a kind of knowledge. In what follows I first explain Ryan’s attack on reductionism and Grimm’s response (Section 1). Afterward, I descri
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