Who One Is Existenz and Transcendental Phenomenology
If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don’t know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac
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PHAENOMENOLOGICA SERIES FOUNDED BY H.L. VAN BREDA AND PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES
190 JAMES G. HART
WHO ONE IS BOOK 2: EXISTENZ AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Editorial Board: Director: U. Melle (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) Members: R. Bernet (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) R. Breeur (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) S. IJsseling (Husserl-Archief, Leuven) H. Leonardy (Centre d’études phénoménologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve) D. Lories (CEP/ISP/Collège Désiré Mercier, Louvain-la-Neuve) J. Taminiaux (Centre d’études phénoménologiques, Louvain-la-Neuve) R. Visker (Catholic University Leuven, Leuven) Advisory Board: R. Bernasconi (Memphis State University), D. Carr (Emory University, Atlanta), E.S. Casey (State University of New York at Stony Brook), R. Cobb-Stevens (Boston College), J.F. Courtine (Archives-Husserl, Paris), F. Dastur (Université de Paris XX), K. Düsing (Husserl-Archiv, Köln), J. Hart (Indiana University, Bloomington), K. Held (Bergische Universität Wuppertal), K.E. Kaehler (Husserl-Archiv, Köln), D. Lohmar (Husserl-Archiv, Köln), W.R. McKenna (Miami University, Oxford, USA), J.N. Mohanty (Temple University, Philadelphia), E.W. Orth (Universität Trier), C. Sini (Università degli Studi di Milano), R. Sokolowski (Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.), B. Waldenfels (Ruhr-Universität, Bochum)
James G. Hart
Who One Is Book 2
Existenz and Transcendental Phenomenology
J.G. Hart Indiana University Department of Religious Studies 230 Sycamore Bloomington IN 47405 USA
ISBN 978-1-4020-9177-3
e-ISBN 978-1-4020-9178-0
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008932178 © 2009 Springer Science + Business Media B.V. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper springer.com
Preface
In Book 1 we sketched an ontology of the agency of manifestation that is this side, on the “hither” side, of the displayed world. We said the source of this agency, the transcendental I, can be referred to non-ascriptively, i.e., as without properties. Normally when we confront something about which nothing can be said, e.g., where the subject under consideration is said to have no distinguishing properties, we rightly lose interest. We have not even a triviality, but rather we have nothing to take hold of conceptually, what the Greeks called a meon, non-being, not-anything. But in Book 1 we spelled out that what we refer to with “I,” i.e., “myself as myself,” and what we experience prior to the reflective indexical achievement, i.e., the lived “myself,” is just such a propertyless not-anything. The first-person singular pronoun, we proposed, builds on a prior sense of oneself, for which we have used reluctantly the awkward term,
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