Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity
This book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level tha
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Juliane Krämer
Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity
T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services Series editors Sebastian Möller, Berlin, Germany Axel Küpper, Berlin, Germany Alexander Raake, Berlin, Germany
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10013
Juliane Krämer
Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity
123
Juliane Krämer Technical University of Berlin Berlin Germany
ISSN 2192-2810 ISSN 2192-2829 (electronic) T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services ISBN 978-981-287-786-4 ISBN 978-981-287-787-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-787-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2015947940 Springer Singapore Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London © Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2015 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Pte Ltd. is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
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Publications Related to this Thesis
The primary results of this work have been presented in the following publications: • Blömer, Gomes da Silva, Günther, Krämer, Seifert: A Practical Second-Order Fault Attack against a Real-World Pairing Implementation. In Proceedings of Fault Tolerance and Diagnosis in Cryptography (FDTC), 2014, Busan, Korea • Krämer, Kasper, Seifert: The Role of Photons in Cryptanalysis. In Proceedings of 19th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), 2014, Singapore • Krämer, Nedospasov, Schlösser, Seifert: Differential Photonic Emission Analysis. In Proceedings of Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design—Fourth International Workshop (COSADE), 2013, Paris, France • Schlösser, Nedospasov, Krämer, Orlic, Seifert: Simple Photonic Emission Analysis of AES. Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer-Verlag • Schlösser, Nedospasov, Krämer, Orlic, Seifert: Simple Photonic Emission Analysis of AES. In Proceedings of Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware a
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