Why Enactivists Should Care about Wittgenstein
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Why Enactivists Should Care about Wittgenstein Victor Loughlin 1 Received: 24 March 2020 / Revised: 1 October 2020 / Accepted: 21 October 2020 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract There is now an established literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and enactivist approaches in cognitive science. However, is this link not just a matter for card carrying Wittgensteinians? Can enactivists not manage perfectly well without Wittgenstein? In this paper, I show why some enactivists should care about Wittgenstein. Focusing on the enactivist view, “Sensorimotor Identity”. I argue that proponents of this view can use Wittgensteinian considerations to resolve an issue confronting their view and thereby shore up their proposed dissolution of the explanatory gap. Some enactivists thus have in fact much to gain by engaging with Wittgenstein. Keywords Wittgenstein . Enactivism . Sensorimotor identity . Phenomenal experience .
Explanatory gap
1 Introduction There is now a growing literature on the link between later Wittgenstein and so-called enactivist approaches in cognitive science (e.g. Boncompagni 2013; Hutto 2013; Hutto et al. 2014; Heras-Escribano et al. 2015; Loughlin 2014, 2019; Moyal-Sharrock 2013; Steiner 2018).1 Consider, for example, that if enactivists share a core idea,2 it is likely 1
Note that all subsequent references in this paper will be to the later Wittgenstein.
2
There are significant differences among enactivists. For example, Mind/Life Enactivists (e.g. Thompson 2007) emphasize the deep continuity between mind and life, insisting that even organisms like bacteria are agents capable of making sense of their environments. On the other hand, Sensorimotor Enactivists (e.g. O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; O’Regan 2009, 2011, 2014) claim that phenomenal experiences are best understood as involving, in some fashion, embodied know-how. Moreover, as this paper highlights, they also claim that this addresses, in various ways, “explanatory gap” issues. Finally, Radical Enactivists (e.g. Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017) argue that contentful properties, like true, false, right or wrong, are not built-in features of human mentality but rather scaffolded by some of our social and linguistic practices. This paper focuses on Sensorimotor Enactivism. For a discussion of how Wittgenstein can impact on Radical Enactivism, see Loughlin 2014. For a discussion of how Wittgenstein can impact on Mind/Life Enactivism, see Heras-Escribano et al. 2015.
* Victor Loughlin [email protected] 1
Center for Philosophical Psychology Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000, Antwerpen, Belgium
Philosophia
that mind and experience should be understood as embodied by agents as and when they interact with their environments. With appropriate caveats, Wittgenstein can be read as taking a similar view. For example, Wittgenstein (1993) wrote: “The essence of the language-game is a practical method (a way of acting, not speculation, not chatter)” (ibid p399; see also 1998, p36; 1983 p183–184).3
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