Wittgenstein on Public Language About Personal Experiences

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Wittgenstein on Public Language About Personal Experiences Mamata Manjari Panda 1 & Rajakishore Nath 2 Received: 17 May 2019 / Revised: 5 September 2019 / Accepted: 7 February 2020 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract In this paper, we would like to discuss Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea that a person’s experiences are necessarily private, and these experiences can only be expressible in a private language. Taking a clue from Wittgenstein, we intend to say that the person’s experiences though private, can also be known by others. In the following sections 243 of his Philosophical Investigations (PI), Wittgenstein argues against the possibility of a private language about the subject’s inner experiences. He contends that by coining names/words to name sensations and our inner experiences, we cannot create a private language. If we have a list of names, that cannot function as a language. We need predicate terms; we need the syntax to link the words in the form of a sentence. If we use private names and use the predicates from the language that everyone knows, then the private words will acquire public status like the terms ‘pain’ and ‘sensation.’ These terms are already part of the public language, and if private experiences like pain and sensation cannot be made public, we would not have these terms in our language at all. This is the reason why any application of words is public, and therefore, there is no possibility of a private language. Wittgenstein concentrates on the public rules that govern the correct application for the use of words. And the expressions are meaningful only when these are used according to rules of grammar; if these expressions do not follow any rules of grammar, these are simply meaningless. Keywords Public language . Private language . Language-game . Solitary individual .

Rule-following . Personal experiences

* Rajakishore Nath [email protected]

1

Department of Philosophy, The M. S. University of Boroda, Vadodara, India

2

Department of HSS, IIT Bomaby, Mumbai, India

Philosophia

1 Introduction In the first section, an attempt will be made to understand the nature of our language and how a philosophical stance about the possibility of a private language is challenged by later Wittgenstein. Within the framework of Wittgenstein’s overall later philosophy, where Wittgenstein speaks of rule-following and language-games, one could challenge the argument in favour of a private language. In this context, the concepts of rulefollowing and language-games are very much important in assuring the coherence of intended communication among the members of a community or group. Hence, in the second section, we will discuss the concept of rule-following. Then in the third section, we will consider language as a game. Whenever Wittgenstein compares language with games or whenever he speaks of and constructs different language games, he particularly gives importance to the social or public nature of our language. Following this exposition, in the last section, we will discuss Wittgen