Why the Self Does Not Extend
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Why the Self Does Not Extend Keith Raymond Harris1 Received: 5 March 2020 / Accepted: 25 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract The defensibility of the extended mind thesis (EMT) is often thought to hinge on the possibility of extended selves. I argue that the self cannot extend and consider the ramifications of this finding, especially for EMT. After an overview of EMT and the supposed cruciality of the extended self to the defensibility of the former thesis, I outline several lines of argument in support of the possibility of extended selves. Each line of argument appeals to a different account of diachronic personal identity. I argue that no such argument for extended selves succeeds, as no account of dia‑ chronic personal identity is both plausible and supports the view that the self can extend. Next, I consider three objections that, if successful, would undercut the pre‑ ceding argument that the self cannot extend. I conclude by reflecting on the implica‑ tions of the conclusion that the self cannot extend, including the prospects for EMT.
1 Introduction The extended mind thesis (EMT) raises questions about personal identity and the boundaries of the self. Some proponents of EMT maintain that the self can extend and that the defensibility of EMT depends on the capacity of selves to extend. In what follows, I dispute the former claim and comment briefly on the implications of this conclusion, especially for EMT. After an overview of EMT and the supposed cruciality of the extended self to the defensibility of the thesis, I outline several lines of argument in support of the extended self. Each line of argument appeals to a different account of diachronic personal identity. I argue that no such argument for the extended self succeeds, as no account of diachronic personal identity is both plausible and supports the view that the self can extend. Next, I consider three objections that, if successful, would undercut the preceding argument that the self cannot extend. I conclude by reflecting on the prospects for EMT in light of the conclusion that the self cannot extend.
* Keith Raymond Harris [email protected] 1
University of Iowa, 570 English‑Philosophy Building, Iowa City, USA
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K. R. Harris
2 The Extended Mind and the Extended Self According to EMT, mental states can sometimes be partially realized in features of the environment.1 In what follows, I sometimes abbreviate this position by saying that the mind extends into the environment. Because the argument for EMT is famil‑ iar territory, I rehearse the argument only briefly here. The argument invokes a func‑ tionalist approach to the mental on which there is no in-principle barrier to mental properties being (partially) realized in features of the environment. This mediumneutral approach to the mental is captured by Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) parity principle: Parity principle If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesita
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