Advanced Persistent Threat Model for Testing Industrial Control System Security Mechanisms

An APT is a targeted multi-step attack that uses zero day exploits to achieve its objectives. In order to find solutions to mitigate APT attacks it is important to understand APT anatomy. This paper proposes an APT testing model developed using design res

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Abstract An APT is a targeted multi-step attack that uses zero day exploits to achieve its objectives. In order to find solutions to mitigate APT attacks it is important to understand APT anatomy. This paper proposes an APT testing model developed using design research methodology that can be used to develop industrial control security (ICS) mechanisms. The model development followed three steps; identifying the components; identifying and explaining the characteristics in each component and developing the model. Six components were identified to be included in the model; reconnaissance, injection, installation, operation, command and control and termination. The model proposed is envisaged as systematic approach to testing and validation of security mechanisms that are aimed at APT detection in ICS. Keywords Advanced persistent threats Attacks Threats



 Industrial control system  Security 

1 Introduction Advanced persistent threats (APT) are persistent cyber-attacks that stealthily infiltrate a network [1]. APT use reconnaissance attacks to gain information about their targeted networks. The information from the reconnaissance attack is used to find Mercy Bere-Chitauro (&)  Hippolyte Muyingi  Attlee Gamundani  Shadreck Chitauro Computer Science Department, Namibia University of Science and Technology (formerly Polytechnic of Namibia), Windhoek, Namibia e-mail: [email protected] Hippolyte Muyingi e-mail: [email protected] Attlee Gamundani e-mail: [email protected] Shadreck Chitauro e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016 S.C. Satapathy et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the International Congress on Information and Communication Technology, Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing 438, DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-0767-5_64

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ways and methods to gain access into the system. Once an APT has found its entry point and positioned itself strategically in the network it establishes a communication channel with its command and control centre. Updates on the APT and further instructions are sent from the command and control centre. Information gathered about the system by the APT is also sent to the command and control centre [2, 3]. APTs are hard to detect in a network because they use sophisticated techniques to camouflage their activities from the usual detection mechanism systems in networks. APTs can also attribute their success to zero-day exploits that are usually entrenched in them to attack networks for the sole purpose of not being detected by intrusion detection systems and antiviruses which normally rely on previously known signatures [4]. The APT; Stuxnet which was discovered in 2010 used zero-day exploits to sabotage Iranian Natanz Nuclear Enrichment facility operations an industrial control system facility [1]. Miniduke a more recently discovered APT which was first announced by FireEye on February 13, 2013 was also targeting industrial control system facilities [5]. ICS are used to automate distri