Argument, Inference and Dialectic Collected Papers on Informal Logic

Chapters 1-12 of this volume contain the papers on infonnal logic and argumentation that I've published and/or read at conferences over the last 17 years. These papers are reproduced here pretty much unchanged from their first appearance; it is my intenti

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Argumentation Library Volume 4

Series Editors: Frans H. van Eemeren, University ofAmsterdam t Rob Grootendorst, University ofAmsterdam Joseph Wenzel, University of Illinois John Woods, University of Lethbridge

ARGUMENT, INFERENCE AND DIALECTIC COLLECTED PAPERS ON INFORMAL LOGIC WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY HANS V. HANSEN by

ROBERT C. PINTO Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-90-481-5713-6 DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0783-1

ISBN 978-94-017-0783-1 (eBook)

Printed an acid-free paper

AII Rights Reserved © 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2001 No part ofthe material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanica1, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

vii

INTRODUCTION by Hans ViIh. Hansen 1. Overview of Chapters 1-12, ix 2. Retrospective: Logic, Dialectic and the Practice of Rational Criticism, xx

IX

Chapter 1: DIALECTIC AND THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT 1. Introduction, 1 2. Presumption and Burden of Proof, 2 3. Do there have to be "objective standards" for assessing arguments?, 4 4. Conclusion, 8 Chapter 2: GENERALIZING THE NOTION OF ARGUMENT

10

1 Doxastic attitudes other than belief, 11 2. Propositional attitudes other than doxastic attitudes, 15 3. Nonpropositional objects of conscious attitudes, 17 4. Conclusion: further questions, 19 Chapter 3: LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY AND ARGUMENT APPRAISAL 1. 2. 3. 4

21

Introduction, 21 Appraising premisses, 23 Suitability of inferential link, 26 Conclusion, 31

Chapter 4: THE RELATION OF ARGUMENT TO INFERENCE

32

1. Arguments and inferences, 32 2. Inference, 39 3. Logical pragmatics, argumentation theory and the evaluation of inference, 43 Chapter 5: INCONSISTENCY, RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM 1. 2. 3. 4.

46

Why is inconsistency a fault?, 46 How serious a fault is inconsistency?, 49 When is it reasonable to tolerate inconsistency?, 51 What about relativism?, 54

Chapter 6: POST HOC, ERGO PROPTER HOC

56

Chapter 7: LOGIC, COHERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY

64

v

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 8: LOGIC, COHERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY REVISITED

73

1. 2. 3.

Introduction, 73 Understanding a domain as necessary background of any reasoning, 74 Is the understanding ofa domain susceptible of propositional or sentential representation?, 75 4. Understanding, coherence and rationality, 78

Chapter 9: LOGICAL FORM AND THE LINK BETWEEN PREMISSES AND CONCLUSION

81

1. 2. 3. 4.

Preliminaries, 81 Semantic entailments, 85 Inductive inferences and Goodman's paradox, 89 The effect of pragmatic considerations on the validity of inductive generalization, 95 5. Conclusion, 96

Chapter 10: ARGUMENT SCHEMES AND THE EV ALUA TION OF PRESUMPTIVE REASONING 1. 2.

98

In what sense d