Bodily expressions, feelings, and the direct perception account of social cognition
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Bodily expressions, feelings, and the direct perception account of social cognition Francesca Forlè 1 # Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract In this paper, I will argue in favor of a direct perception account of social cognition (DP), focusing on the idea that we can directly grasp at least some mental states of others through their bodily expressions. I will investigate the way we should consider expressions and their relations to mental phenomena in order to defend DP. In order to do so, I will present Krueger and Overgaard’s idea of expressions as constitutive proper parts of the mental phenomena expressed and I will show how this position can support DP. Then, I will present the way in which the authors seem to construe the relation of parthood between expressions and mental states – that is in terms of components (or, pieces, as I will argue) of integral wholes, and I will introduce the possible issues that derive from this strategy. I will propose a different way to understand this parthood relation, referring to Husserl’s notion of moments as distinct from that of pieces (Husserl 1900-1901). I will narrow my analysis to expressions of feelings, and I will try to argue that they can be described more aptly as moments of the feelings expressed. Finally, I will show how this account can support DP. Keywords Direct perception theory . Expressions . Feelings . Part-whole relations . Husserl
1 Introduction In the contemporary debate on social cognition, a Direct Perception Theory (DP) has been opposed in recent years to the mainstream accounts of our understanding of others, i.e. Theory-theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST). DP defends the idea that, at least sometimes, we can perceptually grasp others and their mental states. This is so, DP argues, because the mental states of others can be perceived through their bodily expressions. However, how should bodily expressions – and specifically their relations to mental phenomena – be conceived in order for us to * Francesca Forlè [email protected]
1
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Via Olgettina, 58 Milan, Italy
F. Forlè
directly perceive the mental states of others through bodily expressions themselves? In this paper, I will consider Krueger and Overgaard’s proposal on this issue (Krueger and Overgaard 2012), i.e. the idea of expressions as components of those integral wholes that mental states are. I will explore the positives of this account, but I will also highlight some potential issues that stem from it. I will then propose a partially different account that tries to overcome these issues. Before considering Krueger and Overgaard’s account and my own one, let us introduce the main aspects of the debate on social cognition and the proposal made by DP advocates. In a nutshell, the crucial issue at stake in this debate is our ability to access others and their minds, that is to attribute mental states to others and interpret, explain and predict their behavior in mentalistic terms (i.e. in terms of intentions, beliefs, emotions, desires)
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