Democratic Governance and Economic Performance How Accountability Ca
Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals – voters, consumers, shareholders – will favor themselves over the g
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Dino Falaschetti
Democratic Governance and Economic Performance How Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business
Studies in Public Choice
Series Editor Randall G. Holcombe Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida, USA Founding Editor Gordon Tullock George Mason University Fairfax, Virginia, USA
For other titles published in this series, go to http://www.springer.com/series/6550
Praise for Democratic Governance and Economic Performance Dino Falaschetti skillfully synthesizes key ideas from social choice theory, organizational economics, and interest group politics to challenge conventional wisdom about the benefits of democratic governance in organizations. This is an important book for policymakers who are working to reform the way financial institutions are regulated, and corporations are governed, in the wake of the great financial market collapse of 2008. (Margaret Blair, Vanderbilt Law) The scope of “Democratic Governance and Economic Performance” is truly commendable. Falaschetti argues persuasively that well-intentioned legal and regulatory structures can often create as many problems as they solve, often destroying social wealth in the process. While legal scholars, economists, and political scientists have raised parts of these issues before in isolation, by addressing the topic from the ground up at both the theoretical and empirical levels, this book provides useful perspective to anyone interested in the relationship between governance institutions and firm performance (Jon Klick, Penn Law) This insightful book shares with Madison’s “Federalist #10” a concern for the potentially disruptive effects of “majority factions.” In telecommunications regulation, insurance regulation, and monetary policy (among other areas), popular coalitions led by elected officials are tempted by short-term gains to take actions that distort long-term incentives for economic growth. Falaschetti reminds us that some of our most costly economic policies are the direct result of democratic responsiveness, while some of our most successful policies have come from institutions (e.g., the courts and the Fed) that have been designed to be insulated from such democratic pressures (Gary Miller, Washington University, Political Science)
Dino Falaschetti
Democratic Governance and Economic Performance How Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business
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Dino Falaschetti College of Law Florida State University Tallahassee FL 32306-1601 USA [email protected]
ISBN 978-0-387-78706-0 e-ISBN 978-0-387-78707-7 DOI 10.1007/978-0-387-78707-7 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2009927125 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009 All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any fo
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