Domain Conditions and Social Rationality
This book primarily focuses on the domain conditions under which a number of important classes of binary social decision rules give rise to rational social preferences. One implication of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems is that every non-oligarchic social
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Domain Conditions and Social Rationality
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality
Satish Kumar Jain
Domain Conditions and Social Rationality
123
Satish Kumar Jain Formerly Professor Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India
ISBN 978-981-13-9671-7 ISBN 978-981-13-9672-4 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4
(eBook)
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For Abha, Avinash, Mayank, Rajendra and Subrata
Preface
One implication of the impossibility theorems of social choice theory, Arrow impossibility theorem being the most important of them, is that all ‘democratic’ methods of arriving at social decisions by combining individual preferences which satisfy Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives, a requirement quite crucial for the unambiguity of social choices, fail to generate rational social preferences for some configurations of individual preferences. The problem is exemplified by the famous voting paradox associated with the majority rule. Under majority rule, it is possible to have alternative x defeating alternative y in a majority vote, alternative y defeating alternative z in a majority vote and alternative z defeating alternative x in a majority vote, thereby making it impossible to choose rationally from among these three alternatives. Thus, in the context of any rule that is to be used for arriving at social decisions on the basis of individual preferences, it is important to know the configurations of individual preferences under which it would be possible to choose rationally. This monograph is almost exclusively concerned with the derivation of conditions for various rules and cl
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