Emergence in Solid State Physics and Biology
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Emergence in Solid State Physics and Biology George F. R. Ellis1 Received: 9 June 2020 / Accepted: 23 July 2020 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020
Abstract There has been much controversy over weak and strong emergence in physics and biology. As pointed out by Phil Anderson in many papers, the existence of broken symmetries is the key to emergence of properties in much of solid state physics. By carefully distinguishing between different types of symmetry breaking and tracing the relation between broken symmetries at micro and macro scales, I demonstrate that the emergence of the properties of semiconductors is a case of strong emergence. This is due to the existence of quasiparticles such as phonons. Furthermore time dependent potentials enable downward causation as in the case of digital computers. Additionally I show that the processes of evolutionary emergence of living systems is also a case of strong emergence, as is the emergence of properties of life out of the underlying physics. A useful result emerges: standard physics theories and the emergent theories arising out of them are all effective theories that are equally valid. Keywords Reduction · Emergence · Solid state physics · Biology
1 Emergence and Context A major concern in the interplay between science and philosophy is whether emergence is strong or weak when higher level properties of a system emerge out of the properties of its constituent parts. 1.1 Weak and Strong Emergence Chalmers [29] defines weak and strong emergence as follows • Weak Emergence of Phenomena We can say that a high-level phenomenon is
weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phe-
* George F. R. Ellis [email protected] 1
Mathematics Department, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
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Foundations of Physics
nomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level domain ... It often happens that a high-level phenomenon is unexpected given principles of a low-level domain, but is nevertheless deducible in principle from truths concerning that domain. • Strong Emergence of Phenomena We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain. I will accept those definitions; the latter is the concern of the body of paper. Note that in dealing with emergence from a base theory, one will always of necessity make approximations of various kinds, or take limits of the underlying theory. The key issue raised by Chalmers’ definition of strong emergence is the following: • Strong and Weak Derivation of Phenomena Given that approximations or limit-
ing procedures will be used in determining emergent phenomena, (i) are the variables used in this process deducible in principle from the
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