Epistemology of testimony and values in science
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Epistemology of testimony and values in science Tihamér Margitay1 Received: 30 May 2019 / Accepted: 27 July 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract The paper has two interconnected objectives. It argues that the intrinsic epistemic value of testimonies (i.e., serving as evidence for what is asserted) can be reduced to their moral and social values, that is, to their competent, conscientious, and honest performance. Consequently, competence, conscientiousness, and honesty are intrinsic epistemic values in science. The second objective is to offer an answer to the questions why and under what conditions a hearer can rationally accept a testimony in science. The values and subsequent norms of testimony are espoused and strictly enforced by the scientific community. The norms of testimony ensure that rule-following scientists testify competently, conscientiously, and honestly. Due to value reduction, such testimonies also manifest their intrinsic epistemic value, that is, they serve as evidence for their content. So, if the norms of testimony are followed, then it is epistemically rational to adopt also the norm of the acceptance of testimonies. When the hearer accepts a testimony (unless he has counterevidence), he simply—and usually blindly—complies with this norm. Yet, he is epistemically rational because the norm he follows is epistemically rational, as well. Keywords Values in science · Epistemic values · Epistemology of testimony · Social epistemology
1 Introduction While many argue that moral and social values play a significant role in scientific knowledge, the character of these values and their epistemic significance require further clarifications. The received view is that reasoning on the acceptance of a scientific statement should rest exclusively on its epistemic values that are indicative of its truth. (Douglas 2009, 2016) This view is to guard against wishful thinking and secure the epistemic soundness of science. If other values were allowed to be used as a reason
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Tihamér Margitay [email protected] Institute of Business Economics, Eötvös Loránd University, Rákóczi Street 7, Budapest 1088, Hungary
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directly for or against the acceptance of a scientific claim, then this would ruin the rational empirical character of science. (Douglas 2016). While accepting the importance of epistemic values in science, I shall argue that general moral and social values1 also constitute epistemic values concerning testimonies. Consequently, they legitimately have a role to play in the decision about the acceptance of scientific statements (beliefs, claims, hypotheses, theories, etc.) that are based on testimonies. Instead of a table of contents, let me present the skeleton of my arguments. The first part concerns the values of testimony and their role in science. The second part, in turn, discusses the epistemic rationality of the acceptance of testimonies. Part one: Testimony is essential in science and cannot be reduced to other sources of justification. A testimony can manifest an epistemic value
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