Four ways of (mis-)conceiving embodiment in tool use
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Four ways of (mis-)conceiving embodiment in tool use François Osiurak1,2,4
· Giovanni Federico3
Received: 25 May 2020 / Accepted: 16 November 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract A broader conception of the user’s perceptual, cognitive, and motor capabilities considers tools as body extensions. By identifying specific tool-related motor-grounded mechanisms, the embodied approach assumes that this “extensional phenomenon” takes place not only at a behavioral level but also at a psychological level. At least four ways of conceiving embodiment in tool use have been offered in relation to the concepts of incorporation, perception, knowledge, and observation. Nevertheless, the validity of these conceptions has been rarely, if not never, assessed. In this article, we attempt to fill this gap by discussing each of these conceptions in turn, with the aim of determining whether it is justified to consider tools as detached objects of a special sort in embodied terms. We argue that tool incorporation is made possible by “distalization”, that is, an embodied mechanism specific to tool use. Nevertheless, there is neither empirical nor theoretical support for the hypothesis that specific tool-related embodied mechanisms are involved in perception, knowledge, and observation. In broad terms, there is a tendency in the literature to overinterpret tool use as an embodied phenomenon at a psychological level. Inevitably, this limitation leads us to under-intellectualize the underlying cognitive processes and, as a result, it prevents us from understanding the technical-reasoning skills that allow humans to transform dramatically the physical world. Keywords Tool use · Technical reasoning · Tool incorporation · Manipulation knowledge · Perception and action · Action observation
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François Osiurak [email protected]
1
Laboratoire d’Etude des Mécanismes Cognitifs, Université de Lyon, Lyon, France
2
Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France
3
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, Suor Orsola Benincasa University, Naples, Italy
4
Laboratoire d’Etude des Mécanismes Cognitifs (EA 3082), Institut de Psychologie, 5, Avenue Pierre Mendès-France, 69676 Bron Cedex, France
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Synthese
1 Introduction Tools are detached objects of a very special sort. They are graspable, portable, manipulatable, and usually rigid.… An elongated object, especially if weighed at one end and graspable at the other, affords hitting or hammering (a club). A graspable object with a rigid sharp edge affords cutting and scraping (a knife, a hand axe, or a chopper). A pointed object affords piercing (a spear, an arrow, an awl, or a needle).… When in use, a tool is a sort of extension of the hand, almost an attachment to it or a part of the user’s own body, and thus is no longer a part of the environment of the user. But when not in use, the tool is simply a detached object of the environment, graspable and portable, to be sure, but nevertheless external to the observer. This capacity to attach something to the body suggests that th
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