Grounding at a distance
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Grounding at a distance Sam Baron1 • Kristie Miller2 • Jonathan Tallant3
The Author(s) 2019
Abstract What distinguishes causation from grounding? One suggestion is that causation, but not grounding, occurs over time. Recently, however, counterexamples to this simple temporal criterion have been offered. In this paper, we situate the temporal criterion within a broader framework that focuses on two aspects: locational overlapping in space and time and the presence of intermediaries in space and time. We consider, and reject, the idea that the difference between grounding and causation is that grounding can occur without intermediaries. We go on to use the fact that grounding and causation both involve intermediaries to develop a better temporal criterion for distinguishing causation from grounding. The criterion is this: when a cause and effect are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of causal intermediaries between the cause and the effect that are extended in time. By contrast, when the grounds and the grounded are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of grounding intermediaries, but the chain need not be extended in time, it can be purely spatial. The difference between grounding and causation, then, is that causation requires time for chaining in a way that grounding does not. Keywords Grounding Causation Dependence Location Time
& Jonathan Tallant [email protected] Sam Baron [email protected] Kristie Miller [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia
2
Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
3
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
123
S. Baron et al.
1 Introduction How do grounding and causation differ? One answer to this question appeals to time. Williamson, for instance, maintains that there is no grounding over time. The challenger may argue that an object needs non-modal properties to ground its modal properties. For instance, a lump of clay is malleable (a modal property) because it has a certain microphysical structure (a non-modal property). The analogous principle in the temporal case is obviously false: what I was yesterday is not grounded in what I am today, in any useful sense. Even in the modal case, the principle is not obviously true. Indeed, its very meaning is unclear. What is the supposed distinction between ‘modal’ and ‘non-modal’ properties? Malleability is easy to put on the ‘modal’ side, because the word has the modal suffix ‘-ability’. But we cannot assume the mere absence of explicit modal indicators in the phrase ‘microphysical structure’ sufficient for the corresponding properties to be ‘non-modal’. Presumably, the microphysical structure has consequences for what the object can or cannot do or have done to it, otherwise it would not ground malleability. So why exactly does microphysical structure count as ‘nonmodal’? Perhaps the question has a good answer, but that too is to be found by theoretical enquiry. We c
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